In the fall of 2022, the European Parliament and the EU Council adopted a “directive”—the EU’s word for a law—called “EU-2022/2041” to support an “adequate minimum wage.” This directive might well represent a fundamental paradigm shift in European labour law.

For the first time in the otherwise rather neoliberal history of the EU, there is a directive that explicitly aims to give something like “institutional power” to Europe’s trade unions. It might even strengthen the bargaining power of European workers.

In November 2025, Europe’s Court of Justice—in principle—confirmed this new European law.

This means that the national implementation of Directive 2041 moves into central focus. And this is why such measures are called a “directive” and not a law. They are not automatically laws. EU member states—minus the UK but perhaps with Ukraine (unless Putin destroys the place while the orange monster in the White House watches on) and Moldova—have to incorporate such a directive into their body of laws. This is likely to happen.

Meanwhile, the European directive follows two closely related objectives. Firstly, recommendations and procedural requirements have to be put in place to ensure that all EU member states have a statutory minimum wage at an “adequate”—whatever that means—level. The main tool is the use of so-called “reference values” in the assessment of the adequacy of statutory minimum wages.

Such “reference values” rest within the autonomy of EU member states. However, states are strongly encouraged by the directive to use the values of 60% of the gross median wage and 50% of the average wage as benchmarks. Current EU minimum wage policies show the effectiveness of this system. Many EU member states—including Germany—are now using these benchmarks for their statutory minimum wages. This has led to a significant increase in the minimum wage.

The second basic objective is to promote collective bargaining and, in particular, high collective bargaining coverage. We know that a high minimum wage means relatively low wage inequality. In other words, what the EU is doing sharply contradicts the neoliberal mythology that the free market is best for all.

It becomes worse for the apostles and worshippers of neoliberalism. The EU’s minimum wage policy is—de facto—something like a “collective agreement strengthening directive.” Here comes the key issue:

The directive obliges all EU member states in which less than 80% of workers are employed in companies covered by a collective bargaining agreement to create a national action plan for the promotion of collective bargaining.

Such a plan to encourage collective bargaining should be developed with the participation of trade unions and employer associations. Together, they are to introduce “specific measures” for a progressive increase in collective bargaining coverage. This includes a clear timetable for the implementation of the measures and how they are to be reviewed and updated on a regular basis.

With regard to the actual content, the EU’s directive gives states significant autonomy over the design of these plans. However, the directive identifies a number of possible measures to increase collective bargaining coverage and to strengthen the exercise of the right to collective bargaining in national wage-setting arrangements. This relates to four key elements:

1. The EU directive promotes the establishment and development of the capacities of the so-called “social partners”—labour and capital—to engage in collective bargaining, particularly across industrial sectors.

2. The directive promotes constructive, goal-orientated wage negotiations between the social partners under “symmetric conditions” (a neoliberal illusion), in which both parties have access to all relevant information.

3. On the basis of the directive, member states need to establish legal measures for the protection of those exercising the right to collective bargaining and participating in collective bargaining negotiations. States need to protect workers and trade union representatives against discriminatory actions and prevent employers from obstructing unionists and workers engaged in collective bargaining—no more union-busting.

4. Member states are to promote collective bargaining and wage determination by protecting trade unions and employer organisations engaged in collective bargaining from interference by the other side.

One way in which this (1—4) can be achieved—as explicitly stated by the directive—is through public procurement. This can ensure that companies receiving public contracts comply with the directive through their existing collective agreements.

Meanwhile, such member state action plans must be published and officially submitted to the EU. The European Parliament and the Council will assess these plans. While the directive sets no strict deadline, it states that such action plans should be available, at the latest, by the end of 2025.

Today, a first evaluation of these action plans for the promotion of collective bargaining has been carried out by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).

EU member states are free to choose their own data for measuring collective bargaining agreements and the extent to which collective bargaining coverage is progressing. Meanwhile, the EU uses records from Eurostat and the neoliberal OECD.

For such comparisons of collective bargaining coverage, one of the most commonly used databases is the OECD/AIAS ICTWSS Database, developed by the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS) and the University of Amsterdam and now maintained by the—otherwise rather neoliberal—OECD.

The OECD/AIAS ICTWSS database merges national datasets, which are all too often based on very different data sources. In addition to state-collected data, it uses data from employer associations, trade unions and, above all, surveys of enterprises and workers. What all this means is the following:

By the fall of 2025, collective bargaining coverage in just nine member states was above the 80% threshold. They do not need a national action plan to increase collective bargaining coverage. These include, as one would expect, Europe’s northern countries—Denmark, Sweden and Finland—but also southern countries such as Italy, Portugal and Spain, as well as Belgium, France and Austria. Germany is missing. It failed.

Such high collective bargaining coverage is mainly based on two factors:

1. For one, all these countries have well-developed sectorial collective bargaining systems, with industry-wide collective bargaining being the most important level of collective bargaining.

2. Secondly, these countries have extensive government regulations supporting collective bargaining.

Overall, this ranges from Italy and Belgium with 100% collective bargaining coverage to Austria and France with 98%, Spain (92%), Finland (89%), Sweden (88%), Portugal (83%), and Denmark (82%). Below the EU’s 80% mark are the Netherlands (72%), Slovenia (66%), Croatia (65%), Luxembourg (57%), Germany with a miserable 49%, and so on down to Poland with a measly 12% collective bargaining coverage.

In other words, a whopping 18 member states have to introduce an action plan to support collective bargaining coverage, from the Netherlands (72%), which is relatively close to the threshold, to Poland (12%), which has a long way to go.

In most states in the failure group, measures have to support both capital and labour. In Ireland and the Netherlands, for example, the state has to provide greater support for trade unions, while in Estonia and Poland the state needs to support employers. What about Germany, an economically powerful country with close to 84 million people that, in the past, prided itself on good labour relations?

In failing Germany, just under half of all workers are employed in companies covered by collective bargaining agreements. The largest economy in the EU must submit itself to the EU’s minimum wage policy and must produce a national action plan for the promotion of collective bargaining. This is rather shameful for Germany’s conservative government, which is so proud of its institutions, and even more so for arrogant German bosses and equally big-headed employers.

Although the deadline had already expired at the end of 2025, Germany’s conservative government still had not submitted its plan. By June 2026, Merz’s government still had not done what it had agreed to do. Delays when it comes to workers and trade unions are not surprising for the current government of the conservative CDU and its eager helpers and minions, the social-democratic SPD.

To camouflage their abject failure, the government’s coalition agreement explicitly says that Germany’s government seeks to improve the lives of its citizens by providing fair working conditions and good collective partnership. What happened behind the shiny brochures and announcements was that living up to the European minimum wage policy should already have been well underway.

Still, there had been a so-called “consultation process” with thirteen written statements, including those of the German Trade Union Confederation (DGB) and Germany’s “Association of Employers” (BDA), as well as ten sectorial employer and business associations.

Meanwhile, and as expected, the opinions of the DGB (labour) and the BDA (capital) differ on many points, leading to downright conflicting positions between the two parties to collective bargaining. This proved to be at the forefront of the government’s meeting with the two federations in November 2025, which also failed to produce any results. Their positions can be summarised as follows:

The issue at hand: trade unions (labour) and BDA (capital). Germany’s collective bargaining act is in favour of tax incentives for trade union membership, in favour of digital access rights for trade unions, in favour of facilitating the extension of collective bargaining coverage, in favour of extending the legal rights of workers, and in favour of/against the publication of employer membership in employer associations. Strengthening of collective bargaining agreements in favour of protection against union busting and discrimination; in favour of collective bargaining coverage as part of state subsidies; in favour of protecting workers' entitlements in case of bankruptcies; in favour of better protection for trade union members; in favour of tax incentives to support collective bargaining coverage; in favour of improving the ability for trade unions to use companies in favour of/against support for collective bargaining coverage in SMEs in favour of/against it. Strengthening so-called “opening clauses” in collective bargaining agreements against, in favour of easing the administrative burden on companies; indifferent in favour of limits to collective bargaining agreements beyond companies; against in favour of legally enforceable limits to the right to strike; against in favour

Beyond all this, there has been a long debate within German trade unions on how to strengthen collective bargaining. On this issue, Germany’s peak body—the DGB—has presented a broad catalogue of measures as well as the national action plan requested by the EU. These focus on increasing union organising as well as expanding union power and influence in German workplaces. This includes:

• A tax deduction for union dues.

• Under collective agreements, more benefits should accrue to union members in order to stop the free-rider problem.

• Digital access rights for trade unions to obtain vital company documents.

• Better protection against union busting and against management interference with works councils.

• Collective bargaining should be a condition when public works projects are awarded.

• The state should promote collective bargaining coverage.

• Better protection of workers in cases of mergers, acquisitions, and corporate bankruptcies.

Fighting these measures, Germany’s corporate lobbying group—the BDA—has, from the very beginning, rejected the entirety of the EU’s minimum wage policy in principle. Corporate bosses have also refused to justify their position. Instead, the BDA wants to make collective agreements significantly more “flexible”—the code word for weakening them and, if possible, dismantling them. Camouflaged as a “modular collective bargaining policy,” the BDA seeks to give company bosses more power while weakening trade unions.

Worse, the BDA also wants to limit the scope of collective agreements and make it easier for companies to withdraw from collective bargaining altogether. Finally, the BDA calls for the introduction of a restrictive—and potentially anti-strike—law.

From the point of view of the trade unions, all of these measures serve only to increase employer power—the downward road to macho management and corporate despotism. It takes Germany back to the nineteenth century.

Interestingly, these different positions are reflected within Germany’s government, where the pro-capital CDU stands against the somewhat more accommodating SPD. Here, power matters. Often, this is reflected in opinion polls. By the end of June 2026, the neo-fascist AfD stood at 28%, the conservative CDU at 24%, and the social democratic SPD at 12.5%. With only half the support of the CDU, the social democratic SPD has been reduced to little more than a political pittance.

With twice the strength, the conservative CDU—together with the BDA—has been fighting the EU’s directive. Perhaps this also explains why Germany not only failed to measure up to the EU directive but was also extremely late in submitting its data to the EU.

In the end, German conservatives face a stark choice between doing what their, albeit indirect, paymaster and ideological mastermind—the BDA—demands or, on the other hand, trying to present themselves as a pro-EU party that is respected within the EU rather than looked down upon. Ultimately, Chomsky may once again be proven right: it is “profits over people.”

“The overwhelming scale and rate of children killed and injured in Gaza have been unparalleled across modern conflicts globally,” a new report by the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory reaffirmed this week. Building upon earlier evidence and new testimonies, the report backs warnings from Palestinians and international activists that Israeli forces deliberately target Palestinian children as part of a strategy to “destroy the future of the Palestinians in Gaza.”

“That’s a very serious conclusion to come to,” said Australian legal expert Chris Sidoti, one of the commission’s members, during a press conference on 26 June. Yet the widespread use of torture and other degrading treatment, attacks on schools and orphanages, and strikes on key infrastructure needed for children to lead dignified lives—such as hospitals—during the Gaza genocide left little room for doubt.

The report details various ways Israeli occupation forces have harmed children in the Strip since 7 October 2023. These include killing and injuring children through mass bombardment and indiscriminate attacks, as well as direct targeting via sniper fire and quadcopter shootings. These attacks have not ceased since the so-called ceasefire took effect in October last year, with over 100 children killed in Gaza since then. Combined with obstruction of aid deliveries and reconstruction, these actions continue to create a harrowing environment for all residents, particularly children.

“It’s all as it was in October 2025,” Sidoti added. “The [Gaza Peace] Plan should be declared a failure.”

The commission cited dozens of examples of children’s suffering. The list includes six-year-old Hind Rajab, who was killed in an Israeli attack on her family’s car and the ambulance responding to help them. It also describes how small children witnessed their families being shot or kidnapped. In December 2023, the report notes, Israeli soldiers threw four hand grenades into a house in Gaza City hosting 30 people. During the attack, a five-year-old suffered severe injuries, including abdominal evisceration. He was forced to evacuate without medical care. “He lost consciousness at the school while he was treated by a doctor who reinserted his exposed intestines by using nappies and taped his stomach.”

No “normal-sized” babies in Gaza

Interviews with international health workers volunteering in Gaza’s hospitals also revealed the extent of injuries suffered by children. From head and chest wounds to damage to eyes and hearing, the report warned that “at least 21,000 children were made newly disabled in Gaza and approximately 40,500 children suffered ‘war-related’ injuries.”

This means tens of thousands of children require long-term, often lifelong, rehabilitation but are unlikely to receive it due to the systematic destruction of healthcare infrastructure by Israeli forces. The impacts are equally felt by children with pre-existing chronic conditions, newborns, and pregnant women. “By October 2024, women in Gaza were reported to be three times more likely to die in childbirth and three times more likely to miscarry than before October 7, 2023,” the report notes.

By June 2025, a third of births in Gaza were premature, underweight, or required intensive care, including babies born at 32 weeks weighing only 0.9 kilograms. “Doctors have reported no longer seeing ‘normal-sized’ babies in Gaza.”

“There is a direct targeting by Israel to affect the long-term health outcomes of babies,” a paediatric nurse told the commission. “There is no reason why we cannot bring medications into Gaza to help pregnant women and babies, so it makes no sense except to think that this particular group is being targeted due to which there is a higher mortality among newborns.”

Compounding factors for children’s health include extreme temperatures and malnutrition, worsened by conditions created by Israel on the ground: destroyed housing, sanitation infrastructure, and aid obstructions. Speaking at the same conference as Sidoti, emergency physician Dr Mahmooda Syed referred to infectious diseases contracted by children with compromised immune systems due to hunger as “manufactured conditions.”

She emphasised that everything from basic hygiene to administering insulin is impossible in the current situation. A similar point was raised by Al Mezan Center for Human Rights on 25 June, highlighting the spread of insects and rodents resulting from Israel’s actions. The centre warned that “diseases and serious public health hazards have proliferated throughout displacement camps and residential areas amid the absence of clean water, sanitation supplies, and essential services.”

The report highlights cases of skin and hair conditions and faltering oral health. Such “manufactured conditions” often become deadly for children with compromised immunity. One case involved a 12-year-old girl with coeliac disease who suffered severe malnutrition after Israel’s 2025 blockade restricted access to gluten-free foods. The report notes that she lost “one-third of her body weight over six months, resulting in frail limbs, diarrhoea, fatigue, and a weakened immune system.” The child died “due to septic shock from a simple infection.”

“I was not able to finish any operation because every time child patients were taken back to the operating room, their injuries would be covered in maggots and sepsis under the dressings,” another health worker was quoted saying. “These child patients had no immune system due to malnutrition. Children just did not recover.”

Beyond Gaza, the report also sounds the alarm against a sharp increase in violence against Palestinian children in the West Bank, perpetrated particularly by Israeli settlers. The commission documented dozens of settler and Israeli forces attacks, which include killings, maiming, and sexual violence—and expose children to constant fear and trauma.

“By targeting children, Israel is eroding the foundational structure of Palestinian society, weakening the demographic vitality, and overall capacity of the Palestinian people to sustain and exercise its right to determine its future as a people,” the commission concluded. It recommended that governments take urgent and specific action, including a full arms trade ban on Israel, severing financial flows to illegal settlements, and investigating individuals known to have participated in attacks on Gaza—starting with their own citizens.

When something is not working, abandon it. The policy maker and politician, the latter often inclined to populist temptation and the endless tapping for votes, will decide to make a state of wrongheadedness even worse. The evidence is starting to grow that Australia’s daft delving into the world of regulating a child’s access to social media (the arbitrary limit when social media virginity is shed is 16 years) is falling flat. Here, we have the continued, easy target that keeps nourishing the blundering, self-pleasuring prefects in Canberra: irresponsible companies with their social media platforms luring children into a cyberworld of harmful content and damaging consequence. We also have the object of holy salvation: children untouched by the world. Punish the social media platform (though in small spanks rather than vigorous lashings) or at the very least convince them to place age-set limits to accounts; spare the unfortunate, ignorant child supposedly incapable of navigating technology they can master in a fraction of the time their parents can.

The process leading to the passing of the legislation was, it should be remembered, also suspect. With parental certitude and forced caring, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese spoke of saving childhood before the ravaging predations of Silicon Valley. Miraculously, children would cease being screen gorgers and become fit-as-fiddle athletes, climb trees or play the tuba. The underlying, somewhat sinister message, was that of a moral panic taking hold. And where such panic exercises itself, the urges to control, monitor and police tend to follow with molesting predictability. The children become a pretext and, if anything, ought to be ignored. Hence the conspicuous absence of extensive consultation with youth, or their involvement prior to the drafting process.

The resulting Online Safety Amendment (Social Media Minimum Age) Act 2024 (Cth) is not sailing well. It was the subject of a recent analysis in the medical journal BMJ by researchers from the University of Newcastle. The observational study of 408 children between the ages of 12 and 17 found that over 85% of the participants “reported using social media platforms subject to the Act at follow-up.” Between 54-68% reported the use of their own accounts; 66% “reported exposure to platform age verification, most commonly self-declared age (24-39%) or uploading a picture (“selfie”) (13-27%).” Instances of circumvention or the use of social media via a private browser (6-11%) were also noted.

While it is easy to loose oneself in the blissful undergrowth of statistical data, the conclusion of the study is telling and, for the righteous in policy, damning: “Despite the intent of the Social Media Minimum Age Act 2024 to delay access to social media platforms and reduce the potential for online harms, little evidence was found of immediate substantive reductions in reported social media use by adolescent under 16 years.”

The academic study adds some dour bulk to the commentary showing the ban to be fatuous and embarrassingly ineffective. Data provided by the parental monitoring company Qustodio to Crikey in March would not have made pleasant reading to the prohibitionists. “While TikTok, YouTube and Snapchat all saw a decrease in use by Australians aged 10-15, the majority of teens who had been using social media platforms pre-ban remained on the services afterwards.”

That same month, the tireless Mike Masnick of Techdirt, never missing the chance to excoriate Australia’s buffoonish legislation, suggested that the ban had resulted in something far worse than simple failure. Fine if it was simply a case of having to do something for the children and failing for want of perfection. “But that’s not what happened. The ban didn’t leave things where they were. It made things actively worse through a mechanism that was entirely predictable.” The ban entailed “a test of technical sophistication, rather than a test of vulnerability. The kids who can’t figure out how to get around it—or who don’t have friends or older siblings to help them—are the kids who are already isolated or lack the technical skills to bypass a block.” The thick and lonely always get it in the neck.

Add to this the utter absence of punitive grit in the enforcement mechanism—so far no fines have been imposed (they can be as high as AU$49.5 million) for a failure of the platforms to comply—and one wonders where the utility of this feat of ineffectualness lies.

What, then, does the government do? Not abandon a silly policy to please parents who should know better, or voters unaware about the behaviour of children or, for that matter, social media platforms. Instead, Albanese tells his fellow parliamentarians on 25 June that there is “more to do” regarding a ban that is “complex.” His less than able gauleiter, eSafety commissioner Julie Inman Grant, far from admitting failure, simply claims a lack of sufficient teeth in enforcing the ban. “I don’t have potent powers,” she lamented to the Sydney Morning Herald earlier this month.

Worried about remarks made by the surly commissioner, Albanese has returned to the theme of control. “We can’t allow the power that these companies, which are unaccountable, which get massive amounts of … profit and have extraordinary power. We need to make sure that Australians are in charge of this.” His proposal: to increase the threshold of financial penalties to AU$99 million. For the PM, it was abundantly “clear big tech are not doing enough to comply with the law—there are still too many children on social media.” The eSafety commissioner would also be vested with greater powers to compel social media companies to furnish evidence of what had been done to prevent those under 16 years from opening or using an account, including from third parties.

Globally, the desire to hold back youth from perceived corruption, ennui and neuroses at the hands of nasty tech titans is underway. The Australian PM is pleased, for instance, that 16 countries have also decided to replicate the failing ban, because nothing sells in politics like a moralistic prohibition that doesn’t work. This has little to do with matronly urges to protect so much as the opportunist’s desire to exploit a situation. Children are not inherently innocent, charmingly ignorant, and hopelessly impotent as their false defenders assume. They are more than capable of making decisions and attaining an understanding of sophistication and worth regarding the use of technology. In time, as is often the case, they will end up teaching that very generation wishing to close doors how to not only open them but understand what’s behind the barrier, however ghastly it might be.

That Friday in the southwestern Algerian Sahara was scorching hot, with temperatures soaring well above 40°C. The horizon vibrated under the weight of the sun. It wasn’t only hot—it was suffocating, the air pressing down like something solid. Walking felt like walking into a blowtorch held at arm’s length, the heat arriving on your skin before you’d even taken the next step. My eyes stung. Every breath took a little more effort than the last, as if the air itself had thickened.

I had friends with me that day, and I’d brought them out into that heat on purpose. I grew up in this ksar—I know what’s waiting a few hundred meters ahead, even if they don’t.

Before reaching the narrow alleys of the ksar, we passed through a gate, then a porch, into the open square where the village assembly—the djemaa—has always gathered to deliberate. Several alleys begin from that square, branching off in different directions.

The world changed. Long before stepping inside a house, we were greeted by a gentle, refreshing coolness. It was not the harsh, artificial chill of an air conditioner, but a soft, living freshness that seemed to embrace us naturally and effortlessly. One of my friends actually said something—I don’t remember the words, just the tone, somewhere between confusion and relief. I’ve seen that reaction before, and it still doesn’t get old.

This was no accident. It was the result of centuries of accumulated wisdom—a remarkable mastery of architecture, urban planning, and climate adaptation developed by the inhabitants of the Sahara. In places like Taghit, every street, wall, courtyard, and opening was designed with a deep, intuitive understanding of sun, wind, shade, and water.

The question we must ask ourselves today is simple yet devastating: How did modern civilization, with all its technological supremacy, lose the ability to achieve what traditional builders did with earth and wind alone?

The Genius of Intelligent Design vs. The Brutality of Machinery

The Saharan ksour achieved thermal comfort without consuming a single watt of electricity. They relied entirely on intelligent design and a profound respect for the local environment. The inhabitants did not fight the climate; they danced with it.

• The Geometry of Shade: The narrow, winding alleys were intentionally built to minimize direct exposure to the fierce desert sun, ensuring that walls shaded one another throughout the day.

• Thermal Inertia: Thick earthen (adobe) walls absorbed the brutal heat during the day and released it slowly at night when the desert temperatures dropped, regulating the indoor climate naturally.

• Microclimatic Alliances: Buildings were arranged to channel cooling air currents through the settlement, while nearby palm groves further moderated temperatures, creating a beneficial microclimate that extended from the oasis directly into the heart of the ksar.

But the ksar on its own only tells half the story. You cannot really understand it without standing it next to the palm grove, because they were never two separate things—they are one system wearing two different shapes. The ksar is dense, vertical, closed: built to keep heat out. The palmeraie is open, layered, breathing: a place that pulls water up out of the ground and releases it back into the air, palm by palm, hour by hour. The ksar shelters the body. The palmeraie feeds the air the ksar depends on. Neither one explains the coolness alone. I grew up walking between the two without ever thinking of them as separate—the ksar was where we lived, the palmeraie was where the water was, and the air moved between them like it belonged to both.

A History That Still Surprises Me

There is a part of this story that has nothing to do with the ksar itself, and yet I think about it often.

When the French colonial administration arrived in this region, they saw what the builders of Taghit, Béchar, and Kenadsa had achieved—and for a while, they actually tried to imitate it. Walk through the older administrative quarters of Béchar or Kenadsa today and you will find colonial-era government buildings built in adobe, the same earth brick, the same material. But they could not leave it alone. They finished it with a straightedge and a square, gave it a European symmetry, an imported austerity—a building that borrowed the material and missed the spirit. It copied the brick and ignored the wisdom that shaped it, and the result still sits oddly today against the ksar’s own sobriety. I remember being struck, the first time I really looked at these buildings, that the colonial administration had recognized something true about adobe—and still gotten it wrong.

I want to be careful here, because I have no interest in any apology for colonialism, and I won’t have this read as one. But the fact remains, and it is worth saying plainly: in terms of actually adapting to this desert’s climate, the generations of architects and urban planners who came after that period got it wrong, for decades, and at some level, they know it. Somewhere along the way, the idea took hold that a beautiful façade has to be glass and aluminum panel, even if what sits behind it is an oven by two in the afternoon. Add to that the very mundane interests of the concrete lobby—an entire industry with no reason to celebrate a technique that requires no cement, no steel, nothing imported—and it becomes easier to understand why earth construction was pushed aside. Not because it stopped working. Because nobody profited from it working.

Earth never betrayed anyone. It is the oldest building material humans have ever had, and it has sheltered us since the beginning without asking anything in return. Hassan Fathy understood this with painful clarity in the middle of the last century, when he tried to bring mud-brick construction back to Egyptian villages and ran into a wall of contempt—from officials, from contractors, from people who had been taught that progress meant glass and concrete and anything that glittered. He spent a career proving that earth could be dignified, and watched the establishment refuse to believe him anyway.

I think about that contempt for earth sometimes, and it strikes me as a strange thing for any of us to carry, given where this all ends regardless. We spend our lives building further and further away from the ground—glass towers, steel frames, anything that announces we have left the dirt behind. And then it is the dirt that takes us back, in the end, along with the worms.

The Vicious Cycle of Modern “Cooling”

Today, despite our advanced technologies, many modern architects and urban planners struggle to reproduce such an achievement. We build cities that are increasingly dependent on mechanical air conditioning, yet we utterly fail to create comfortable outdoor spaces.

The paradox is striking: modern cooling systems may make buildings habitable, but they do so by transferring heat from the interior to the exterior. Every air conditioner cools a room by expelling even more heat into the surrounding environment. In many hot cities, thousands of air-conditioning units operate simultaneously, warming streets and public spaces and contributing to the catastrophic urban heat island effect.

We consume vast amounts of energy to correct problems that traditional builders solved through design alone.

The contrast is a critique of our modern lifestyle. The ksour created cool public spaces before one even entered a building, fostering community and outdoor life. Modern cities, by comparison, offer air-conditioned interiors surrounded by overheated, hostile streets and plazas. The result is a vicious cycle: hotter outdoor environments increase the demand for mechanical cooling, which in turn releases more heat outdoors.

A Blueprint for the Future, Not Nostalgia

The ksour of southern Algeria are therefore much more than historical monuments or tourist attractions. They are living lessons in bioclimatic architecture and sustainable urbanism. They remind us that our ancestors possessed a sophisticated, scientific understanding of environmental design—one that modern society has too often neglected, marginalized, or forgotten under the guise of “progress.”

Standing in the shaded alleys of Taghit on a day when the desert temperature exceeds 40°C, one cannot help but wonder: how did we abandon such knowledge? How did we trade self-sufficient harmony for energetic dependency?

And perhaps more importantly, how can we recover and adapt this wisdom to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century?

The answer to climate change and rising energy costs may lie not in ever more powerful air conditioners, but in rediscovering the principles that made the ksour of Taghit so comfortable, resilient, and harmonious with their environment in the first place. These ancient settlements offer something far more valuable than nostalgia: they offer a blueprint for a livable future.

Israeli authorities hosted several politicians from European countries this week, signalling continued ties despite threats to sever communications with high-ranking EU officials over alleged comparisons of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians to apartheid South Africa.

On 22 June, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar met with Dubravka Šuica, the EU Commissioner for the Mediterranean, as well as Željka Cvijanović, the Serb member of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s presidency. During her visit, Šuica also met Israeli President Isaac Herzog, while Cvijanović attended a meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Both guests reaffirmed their support for Israel’s so-called security.

The EU maintains support for Israel’s “right to security.”

“I am pleased to be in Israel, one of our key partners,” Šuica wrote on social media, still ignoring calls from over a million EU citizens to end the EU-Israel Association Agreement. “We discussed ongoing challenges and how we can address them together. I underlined that the EU fully supports Israel’s right to security.”

“With Isaac Herzog, we discussed EU-Israel relations, including open challenges and potential new opportunities to strengthen our cooperation on areas of shared interest,” the EU Commissioner added. “Israel is a key partner. We share deep ties and a common interest in a stable and secure Middle East.”

Šuica also met Palestinian Authority representatives. However, critics argue the bloc’s primary intention remains preserving relations with the occupation, despite a slightly stricter narrative on settler violence emerging in official EU stances. Progressive politicians and activists also criticised Šuica’s participation in Donald Trump’s “Board of Peace” meetings, warning it legitimises a colonialist approach to Palestine.

Additionally, the EU Commissioner’s visit drew criticism from well-known figures inside the EU. Former High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell—the man who once compared Europe to a garden to be protected from the jungle represented by the rest of the world—highlighted the hypocrisy of Šuica sitting with Sa’ar days after he threatened to cut ties with current High Representative Kaja Kallas. Reports suggest Kallas had compared Israel’s treatment of Palestinians to apartheid-era South Africa during a private meeting with Mexican officials. Kallas has avoided confirming these statements publicly, appealing for “respectful and constructive” exchanges following Sa’ar’s announcement.

Shared Islamophobic tropes from Israel to the Western Balkans

Željka Cvijanović expressed more explicit support for Israeli authorities than Šuica. Current representative of the Republika Srpska entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s presidency, Cvijanović hails from the same party as Milorad Dodik, who is known for denying war crimes, amplifying separatist narratives, and forging ties with authoritarian political groups.

In this context, Israel has long maintained strong relations with the Republika Srpska. Cvijanović met with Netanyahu in a diplomatic setting without Bosnian flags, prompting the Bosnian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue a formal note of protest. The visit sparked outrage in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with critics warning that Cvijanović was aligning with an entity accused of war crimes and promoting Islamophobic narratives.

This concern was linked to Sa’ar’s remarks about the “need to safeguard Christian minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina” as well as Cvijanović's speech at the JNS Summit. There, she praised Israel for building “democracy” in the region and called for intelligence sharing and “strengthening security partnerships.”

“This is a struggle between civilisation and extremism, between free societies and violent ideologies,” Cvijanović said, equating Israel with “free societies.” “It is about choosing now between those who want coexistence and those who want domination, between those who defend life and those who glorify death,” she stated, propagating a distorted image of West Asia.

Iran is demanding that all members of the NATO alliance who participated in the US-Israeli war against the country earlier this year be held accountable for war crimes and other violations of international law.

The demand followed the recent admission by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte about the role of European countries during the US-Israeli war in Iran, which began on 28 February and ended with a ceasefire on 8 April.

Speaking to Fox News on Wednesday, Rutte admitted that thousands of aircraft took off from US bases in various European countries during the US-Israeli aggression in Iran.

“Country after country, ally after ally have made their bases available.” Rutte described “between 4,000 to 5,000 planes taking off from European bases to support Epic Fury.” He was responding to complaints about the underwhelming support of NATO members during the US war efforts in Iran.

Rutte repeated those comments during his meeting with US President Donald Trump later in the day.

However, Trump still looked unimpressed with Rutte’s claims. He expressed his displeasure at the European role and publicly questioned NATO’s contributions to his war efforts, claiming that he was disappointed with most of them.

Italy refutes Rutte’s claims.

Rutte specifically named Italy and Romania, citing them as examples of European support for the US war in Iran officially termed Operation Epic Fury.

“If you look at Italy, 500 planes took off from US bases in Italy to support Epic Fury,” Rutte claimed, putting Italy’s right-wing government in an awkward position given its public stance of opposition to the war.

Italy is home to over a hundred US military installations, including a large naval base in Sicily and an air base in the northern region.

However, the right-wing government under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni had officially distanced itself from the US war efforts, largely due to the strong popular sentiment against the war in the country.

Italy has witnessed large public protests and strikes carried out mostly by workers against any involvement in Israeli wars in Palestine, Lebanon, or US-Israeli attacks in Iran in the last few months.

Rutte’s claims about Italy have now created a massive backlash in the country, with the opposition seeking fresh explanations from the government.

On Wednesday, the Meloni government refuted Rutte’s claims, calling them “misleading.”

“As already clarified in the parliament, the government authorised exclusively technical and logistical, non-kinetic activities,” Italy’s defence minister Guido Crosetto was reported saying.

Crosetto also claimed that Rutte was confusing “authorised support flights with combat-related operations,” claiming their involvement was purely limited to “technical and logistical support.”

Crosetto claimed that Italy’s actions did not violate any international laws and its acts were as per the arrangements made under its constitution and agreements with its allies, Reuters reported.

Damning admission of NATO’s complicity

Esmail Baghaei, official spokesperson of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, raised the issue of accountability in a social media post on Thursday, 25 June.

Baghaei called Rutte’s comments a “clear and damning admission of NATO’s active complicity in an unlawful war of aggression against a sovereign UN member state—a flagrant violation of international law and the core principles of the UN Charter.”

Along with Italy and Romania, which were named by Rutte, “every other European country that has assisted the US-Israeli aggression against Iran must explain to their own people and to the world why they chose to collude in this blatant act of aggression and in the commission of mass atrocities against Iranian people,” Baghaei insisted.

More than 3,300 Iranians, including hundreds of children and its top political and military leadership, among others, were killed in the US-Israeli strikes, which went on for nearly 40 days.

The indiscriminate bombings carried out by the US and Israel destroyed hundreds of schools, university campuses, science laboratories, sports complexes, and other civilian infrastructure as well as medical facilities in the country, apart from crippling the global economy after Iran imposed restrictions on trade through the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation.

One such US strike on an elementary school in Minab killed over 160 school girls during the first hours of the war, creating global outrage and allegations of war crimes.

“The organisation [NATO] and its individual member states that participated in such decision-making must be held accountable for all the consequences,” Baghaei said.

Chanting, “We are not partners, we are workers,” hundreds of workers across Mexico who provide rides and deliveries through apps held a two-hour work stoppage on 15 May demanding fair rates, an end to unjustified deactivations, and ultimately, a collective labor agreement with app giants like Uber, Didi, and Rappi (two Uber-Eats style delivery platforms).

The National App Workers Union (la Union Nacional de Trabajadores por Aplicación, UNTA) said the work stoppage included workers in five states and Mexico City. They were joined by app workers in at least 15 countries who held similar stoppages during peak hours.

President Claudia Sheinbaum advanced a landmark federal labor law reform in 2024 recognizing Mexico’s 1.2 million app-based workers as employees—granting them access to social security, profit-sharing, and federal housing credits. But the bar to access these benefits remains too high, workers say: only 10 percent of app workers earn enough to be eligible.

Luis Fernando Mora Reyes, an app worker for seven years and the union’s Secretary of Training and Culture, said he took inspiration from the Flint Sit-Down Strike at General Motors in 1936-7, a landmark in the organizing of auto workers in the U.S.

“Getting off your motorcycle or [out of your] car, and sitting on the sidewalk with a group of workers while you’re discussing, talking, exchanging ideas about the union,” he said, “it reminded me a lot about these images of strikers within the plants at Flint.”

Mora Reyes shuttles pizzas, groceries, and meal orders on his trusty bike. In an average week, he bikes between 15 and 40 miles: “It depends on my knees,” he said. Even then, Mora Reyes said, he’s one of the lucky ones who can do this work part time as his second source of income. He thinks of his older colleagues who work full time, “who can’t afford a motorcycle, let alone a car, and I see how they suffer.”

Impossible Bar

In order to qualify for benefits under the new labor law, workers who make deliveries using a car must make about 19,000 pesos per month (approximately $1,105 USD), which is double Mexico’s minimum wage. What’s more, not all of their earnings are counted towards this salary floor: 48 percent are excluded to account for costs like gasoline and maintenance.

This carveout “is a mutilation of our rights,” said Shaira Garduño Tovar, Secretary of Gender Equity for the union. Motorcycle drivers like her need to make approximately 14,000 pesos per month to qualify; currently, she makes between 7,000 and 8,000 per month. “I’d need to work from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. Imagine spending 12 hours [straight] on a motorcycle—the strain on the body that that entails.”

The app giants and pro-employer groups lobbied for the carveout to minimize the contributions they would be required to make into the Mexican Social Security Institute system, said Sergio Guerrero, General Secretary of the UNTA, in 2025. “We at UNTA have always opposed these percentages. The position of these companies was the one that was taken into account.”

Water, Tacos, and Oil

Since the union’s founding in November 2020, UNTA members have worked to build relationships with other app drivers across the country.

Their efforts are complicated by the extensive reach of company unions. An estimated 90 percent of collective bargaining agreements in the nation are pro-employer “protection” contracts that lock in low wages and stave off actual union representation.

Building relationships with these workers—and making the case for a very different sort of unionism—can’t be rushed. At the heart of it is “letting them see that we’re not sent by the government, we’re not delinquents, just everyday workers,” said Mora Reyes. “They see we’re not offering money, but instead promising our loyalty, our work, and our commitment. Those who stay, stay for the right reasons.”

One approach that has helped: the union puts on “solidarity stands” in areas where app workers tend to congregate: “We offer them a bit of water; if possible, a bit of food, maybe a taco or a slice of pizza,” said Pedro Guerra, who has worked on the apps for eight years. “Where we can afford it, we’ve been able to give them oil for their motorcycles, perform minor maintenance like lubricating their chains, things we know represent an extra cost out of drivers' pockets.”

Orange Zones

The union has also established a handful of “orange zones” where drivers can go if they’re experiencing a safety issue, or just need a place to use the restroom. The zones have no formal government backing or financial support; UNTA simply works to get local business on board. “It’s a web of solidarity that we’re building,” said Mora Reyes.

There are also group chats where drivers can check in if they feel unsafe, said Luis Fernando Higuera Rivera, head of the union’s organizing committee in Mexicali. “If a client [is harassing] a driver, she can place an alert in our group.” Any drivers who are in the area then approach to de-escalate the situation if needed.

But despite every effort to mitigate the risks, the work remains grueling. “Day after day, we face accidents,” said Garduño Tovar. “We face the risk of being assaulted.” That fear is especially present for workers who deliver on a bike or motorcycle: “If you have an accident, your car covers you. But for us on the bikes, the first thing that goes flying is our bodies.”

Weather conditions raise the stakes. “Even when the roads are dry it’s risky, because any tiny thing on the pavement, a bit of oil or sand can cause you to skid when you brake,” she said. “Just imagine when it’s raining.”

Many workers, particularly those on bikes and motorcycles, try to avoid driving in the rain, despite the financial hit: “It’s not worth risking my life for 30 pesos,” Guerra said.

“I Have Three Bosses”

The apps offer the promise of being your own boss. But for Mora Reyes, that couldn’t be further from the truth. “I have three bosses,” he said. “The government, the app, and the client. I’m accountable to all three. If I do something the app doesn’t like, they deactivate me. If I do something the customer doesn’t like, they deactivate me. If I do something the government [doesn’t like], I’m detained. We’re everything but our own bosses.”

While app workers may not be their own bosses, they can still run their own unions. One tactic to foster member leadership: UNTA’s digital courses on organizing tactics, economics, and writing skills. The classes are open not just to UNTA members, Guerra said, but to any app worker who’s interested, and to members of other unions: “We’ve had electricians and people from the water department attend too.”

Guerra has led the writing courses himself. The first two sessions focus on writing fundamentals like sentence structure and tenses. The last two address logical fallacies and how to structure arguments. He gives students assignments to make sure the material is landing, he said, “but the real impact is felt in the daily life of the organization. One of the aims is to decentralize skills, in order to decentralize power. The more skills our members have, the more prepared they are when they hold union office.”

The app giants won’t stand by idly as Mexican workers enforce their labor rights. But there is plenty of fertile ground for organizing. “I was always sure there would be a reform. I never doubted it,” said Garduño Tovar. “The platforms arrived in Mexico nearly 13 years ago. It took nearly 10 years to win that reform. Maybe it will take us another 10 years, but we’re going to eliminate that [carveout]. We can win this.”

Originally produced for Labor Notes

Britain could have a new prime minister as early as mid-July after Keir Starmer announced his resignation on Monday, 22 June. The announcement came amid widespread discontent with Starmer’s policies and mounting calls for him to step down. Newly elected parliamentarian Andy Burnham, former mayor of Greater Manchester, is widely expected to replace Starmer as both prime minister and Labour Party leader.

Left-wing and progressive critics have denounced the Starmer administration for failing to address working-class concerns and endorsing Europe’s regional military build-up. Beyond economic policy, they have also emphasised Starmer’s support for Israel throughout the Gaza genocide—including his government’s refusal to implement an arms embargo on Israel and their crackdown on the Palestine solidarity movement and civil rights in general.

“Keir Starmer could have ended child poverty, homelessness and the grotesque levels of inequality in this country,” Your Party’s Jeremy Corbyn—whom Starmer helped oust from the Labour Party—wrote in reaction. “Instead, he abandoned those in need, destroyed our civil liberties and facilitated genocide in Gaza. That is how this prime minister will be remembered—and that is the legacy of moral and political bankruptcy he leaves behind.”

Corbyn’s party colleague Zarah Sultana highlighted Starmer’s involvement in several high-level scandals that have shaken the Labour Party recently, including the appointment of Peter Mandelson as ambassador to the United States despite his close association with convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein. “A man who gave the top diplomatic job to the ‘best pal’ of a convicted paedophile, said Israel has the right to cut off water and electricity to Gaza, rolled out the red carpet for Israeli war criminals, and kept the weapons flowing to the Israeli military as it committed genocide,” Sultana wrote of Starmer.

“Ultimately, Starmer will go down as one of the most unpopular prime ministers in British history,” the Peace & Justice Project echoed. “In less than two years, he has gone from a historic landslide to a Labour government on the brink of political extinction.”

Over the past two years, Starmer’s cabinet has also walked back many pledges from the 2024 campaign, cutting welfare, continuing the privatisation of health services, and failing to take decisive action on the cost-of-living crisis. When progress was made—such as scrapping the two-child benefit cap—it only happened under intense pressure from both Labour members and the public.

In the context of economic policy, left-wing analysts point to Starmer’s continuation of austerity-driven policies previously advanced by Conservative governments. “Starmer and his chancellor are playing the same tired austerity game while enabling and empowering the finance curse perpetuated by the City of London, throwing in for good measure cuts in international aid to fund a military spending trickle under the guise of a ‘Strategic Defence Review’,” wrote former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis. “It is the same old doctrine: austerity for the masses, socialism for the financiers and the arms dealers.”

As a result, trade unions that have backed Labour for decades have recently expressed extreme discontent, signalling they might cut ties with the party and consider backing others as a more progressive alternative to the far-right Reform and other right-wing options.

Looking ahead, several trade union leaders emphasised that the new Prime Minister must honour promises to bring services like transport and water into public hands and oppose anti-migrant and racist rhetoric.

“The next Prime Minister has an opportunity to break with tinkering around the edges and deliver a complete transformation of this country, permanently shifting wealth and power to working-class people,” stated Andrea Egan, head of the public services union UNISON. “Schools, hospitals, councils and transport—and the public service heroes working in them, keeping our country running—must be the fiscal priority, not the military and foreign wars.”

“Whoever replaces Keir Starmer needs to be clear that the status quo has to change,” said Fire Brigades Union leader Steve Wright. “The reason we find ourselves with yet another PM standing down is that, like May, Johnson, Truss and Sunak before him, Starmer failed to break with the perceived wisdom of attacking public services, failing to tackle wealth inequality, whilst letting privatised public utilities rip off the people of this country. A new Labour leader needs to learn that lesson and learn it fast.”

On Saturday, 20 June, the UN Security Council raised concerns over “the imminent risk of mass atrocities” against the civilians in El Obeid, capital of war-torn Sudan’s North Kordofan state.​

The city has been encircled by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which has been at war with its former ruling partner, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), since April 2023.​

Amid an increasing build-up of RSF troops around the city, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk warned on 18 June of an “imminent offensive” with the risk of “serious international crimes.”

The UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, is also “alarmed” by the RSF’s “substantial military reinforcements around El Obeid,” said his spokesperson, Stéphane Dujarric, adding, “We must not allow the horrors of El Fasher to be repeated in El Obeid.”​

The city of El Fasher was the last major SAF holdout in the vast Darfur region in western Sudan. Laying siege for over 500 days to cut off the supplies of food, medicines, and other essentials, the RSF caused a famine and subjected the population weakened by hunger to repeated bombardment before finally overrunning their defences.

Killing civilians in what is estimated to be tens of thousands, the RSF depopulated the city with a campaign of atrocities which, according to a UN probe, bore the “defining characteristics of genocide.”

​After its takeover of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state, the RSF consolidated control over the entire Darfur region, consisting of five states, with the exception of some towns on the border with Chad, across which the conflict has begun to spill over.

​Following this consolidation in the west, the RSF has been expanding eastward into the Kordofan region, which has now become a main frontline of the war between the SAF and the RSF.

​North Kordofan state’s capital, El Obeid, sits on the highway connecting El Fasher to the national capital, Khartoum, to which the SAF-led government had returned only in January 2026, over two and a half years after relocating to Port Sudan in the early days of the civil war.

​The RSF has held El Obeid in siege-like conditions for over 18 months and killed scores of civilians with drone strikes over the last 10 days. 500,000 civilians in the city are at risk of suffering mass atrocities if the RSF launches an attack, the UN Human Rights Council warned.​

“We cannot allow the repeat of the preventable atrocities we documented in El Fasher,” Türk said, adding, “Let this be a stark warning to the world about an impending human rights disaster and worsening humanitarian situation.”

The Iran-US Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) emerged not from reconciliation, but from exhaustion and strategic failure by the United States and its allies. It was the product of a war that had reached its political limits. Washington and Tel Aviv presented their illegal war of aggression as a necessary response to Iran’s nuclear energy program, missile capabilities, and regional alliances. Yet behind this language of security lay a broader objective: to weaken Iran decisively and restore a regional order centered on unquestioned US and Israeli dominance.

For more than two decades, successive US administrations had sought to contain Iran through sanctions, diplomatic isolation, covert operations, cyberwarfare, and targeted assassinations. The recent war represented the most intense expression of this strategy. The assumption in Washington and Tel Aviv was that overwhelming force would cripple Iran’s military infrastructure, fracture its state capacity, provoke internal instability, and perhaps open the way for political transformation.

That expectation was not fulfilled. Iran suffered extensive damage to military facilities, infrastructure, and economic assets. Civilian life was severely disrupted. But the Iranian state did not collapse. Its command structures continued to function, its armed forces retained retaliatory capacity, and its leadership preserved enough cohesion to withstand the assault. Despite the murder of several key leaders of the Islamic Republic, it remains in authority and its legitimacy has in fact been strengthened.

Equally important, Iran demonstrated that it could impose costs beyond its own borders. Missile and drone attacks reached Israeli territory and threatened strategic infrastructure across the Gulf Arab states. The conflict imposed by the US and Israel ended up with disrupted shipping routes, raised insurance costs, unsettled energy markets, and reminded governments across the world that instability in the Gulf cannot be contained within the region.

As the war continued, the gap between military power and political achievement became increasingly visible. The United States and Israel possessed overwhelming military superiority, but they could not convert battlefield pressure into decisive political outcomes. Iran remained intact; regime change did not occur. The Axis of Resistance—from Iran to the Mediterranean Sea—was weakened but not eliminated. Continued escalation promised greater destruction, but not strategic victory. Due to this fact, the MoU is not a final peace treaty. It is a provisional framework designed to halt direct hostilities, reopen channels of negotiation, and prevent the conflict from spreading further.

Its first and most immediate provision is a temporary cessation of direct military operations. The framework establishes a 60-day period during which the parties are expected to negotiate the terms of a more durable settlement. This pause does not resolve the underlying conflict, but it creates space to prevent accidental escalation and reduce the immediate risk of a wider regional war.

Second, the MoU centers on the Strait of Hormuz. This is the agreement’s most economically significant feature. Roughly one-fifth of globally traded petroleum passes through this narrow waterway. During the war, threats to shipping demonstrated both Iran’s geographic leverage and the vulnerability of the global economy to instability in the Gulf. The MoU treats maritime deconfliction not as a technical matter, but as a central pillar of regional and global economic stability.

Third, the agreement establishes a process for negotiations over Iran’s nuclear energy program. Crucially, it does not impose immediate dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Instead, it opens discussions on enrichment levels, inspection mechanisms, monitoring arrangements, and the possible return of international technical oversight. This marks a shift from coercion to bargaining: Iran is not being treated simply as a target, but as a state whose consent is required for any durable nuclear arrangement.

Fourth, the MoU includes discussions on sanctions relief, oil exports, and the possible release or mobilization of Iranian financial assets. The details remain contested. But the principle is clear: economic strangulation did not produce surrender. A sustainable settlement will require some degree of economic accommodation.

Fifth, the agreement reportedly includes regional deconfliction mechanisms, particularly around Lebanon. This reflects the fact that the conflict was never only bilateral. Iran’s regional alliances, Israel’s military operations, US security commitments, and the fragile balance in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and the Gulf are all connected. Any agreement that ignores this regional architecture will remain unstable.

The most revealing aspect of the MoU is what it omits. It does not demand regime change, it does not require Iran to abandon its missile program, and it does not force Tehran to withdraw entirely from regional political and security affairs. In short, the agreement recognizes Iran as a regional power whose interests must be negotiated, not simply bombed away.

The MoU exposes important differences between the strategic priorities of the United States and Israel. For Israel, the war was an opportunity to reshape the regional balance of power. Israeli policymakers have long regarded Iran as the principal obstacle to their strategic ambitions in West Asia. The weakening of Hezbollah, the fragmentation of resistance networks, and the isolation of Tehran were seen as necessary steps toward a regional order more favorable to Israel. The United States shared some of these objectives but operated under broader constraints. Washington had to consider not only military outcomes, but also oil markets, global trade, Gulf allies, domestic political pressures, and the risk of wider international involvement. As the costs mounted, US calculations increasingly diverged from Israeli maximalism.

The result is an agreement that many in Israel are likely to regard as insufficient. The war did not eliminate Iran as a strategic actor. It did not produce regime change. It did not destroy Iran’s capacity to influence events beyond its borders. Most importantly, it ended not with capitulation, but with negotiation. This outcome reveals a deeper problem for Israeli strategy. Military superiority can inflict enormous damage, but it cannot by itself produce political legitimacy or regional acceptance. Israel can strike targets across West Asia, but it cannot determine the political future of societies beyond its borders through force alone.

For the United States, the MoU represents the recognition of another reality: military dominance no longer guarantees political obedience. This lesson has been learned repeatedly in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and now once again in relation to Iran.

The Gulf Arab monarchies are among the most important observers of this agreement. Throughout the conflict, Gulf governments were caught between competing pressures. They remain dependent on US security guarantees and have expanded overt or covert relations with Israel. At the same time, they understand that any regional war with Iran places their own economic and social stability at risk. The disruption of shipping routes and threats to regional infrastructure made this vulnerability unmistakable. The Gulf states possess immense wealth, but their economies depend on secure maritime trade, stable energy exports, foreign investment, and the confidence of global markets. A prolonged war endangers all of these.

The likely conclusion for Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman is pragmatic rather than ideological. They will continue to work with Washington. Some will maintain or deepen relations with Israel. But they will also seek channels with Tehran and avoid becoming direct platforms for escalation. This trend was already visible before the war. The Saudi—Iranian rapprochement facilitated by China in 2023 reflected a growing recognition that regional stability cannot be achieved through permanent confrontation. The war has reinforced that conclusion. The Gulf monarchies have learned that neither Iran nor the United States is going away. Their future depends not on choosing one side permanently against the other, but on managing the contradictions between them while protecting their own interests.

Whether Iran has won depends on how victory is defined. If victory means avoiding destruction, Iran did not win. The country suffered severe economic losses, infrastructure damage, military degradation, and human costs. The burden of the war fell heavily on ordinary Iranians. But strategic outcomes are not measured only by damage suffered. They are also measured by political objectives achieved or prevented.

The central objective of the United States and Israel was not merely to damage Iran. It was to fundamentally weaken Iran as an independent regional actor. On that measure, the campaign fell short. Iran remains sovereign and the government of the Islamic Republic remains in power. Its military capabilities have been reduced but not eliminated. Its diplomatic relevance has been strengthened by the fact that negotiations now revolve around securing Iranian consent rather than imposing foreign dictates. In this sense, Iran achieved what many states facing overwhelming military pressure have sought throughout history: survival. Survival is not romantic. It is often costly, brutal, and incomplete. But in international politics, survival can be the most important measure of strategic success.

The larger significance of the war lies elsewhere. The conflict demonstrated once again that destruction is not the same as power. Military force can demolish infrastructure, kill combatants, and impose suffering. What it cannot always do is produce political transformation. The United States and Israel possessed vastly superior military capabilities, yet they could not secure the political outcome they desired. The Iran—US MoU is therefore not a story of decisive victory by either side. It is the story of a war that revealed the limits of coercion. Iran emerges battered but standing. The United States and Israel emerge powerful but unable to dictate terms. The Gulf states emerge more conscious of their vulnerability. The region enters a new phase in which negotiations, rather than battlefield victories, will determine the next chapter of West Asian politics. That is the deepest political meaning of the MoU: military power can destroy, but it cannot always rule.

The Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced on Monday, 22 June, its decision to put 10 US companies on its export control list, following the US government’s “wrongful act” of blacklisting major Chinese firms.

According to the Commerce Ministry, the move aligned with China’s export control law, as well as regulations on the export of dual-use items.

“The measure was taken to safeguard national security and interests and fulfil international obligations such as non-proliferation,” the ministry stated.

Among the 10 US entities on the export ban list, most are related to weapons manufacturing and technology sectors. It includes motor manufacturer Aveox Inc, rare earth mine operator MP Materials Corp, drone manufacturer Teal Drones, robotics firm Jaia Robotics, and others.

The order bars the Chinese companies from exporting any material of Chinese origin to these entities. It also bars companies in third countries from exporting any Chinese material to these entities in the future, apart from halting all ongoing contracts to do so.

In a related order, the Chinese Ministry of Finance barred all government procurement from 46 other US companies, including subsidiaries of weapon manufacturing giants such as Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Boeing.

Retaliation for US actions

In early June, the US had announced adding around 80 Chinese companies, some of them quite well known and among the largest in their respective sectors, such as the electric car maker BYD, e-commerce giant Alibaba and search engine Baidu, to a blacklist called “entities identified as Chinese military companies operating in the US.”

The US officials alleged that these companies have direct links with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and pose a threat to national security.

China had objected to the move, calling it discriminatory, and demanded the US end the repeated suppression of its legitimate business interests in the name of national security.

Last week it was reported in the media that the Trump administration had decided to add more than 100 Chinese companies, including the AI startup DeepSeek and memory chip maker CXMT, to its restrictive entity list.

Similar accusations of these companies having collaborations with the Chinese military were cited as reasons.

If a company is put on the entity list, no US entity can sell goods, software, or technology to it without a prior licence to do so. Such licence requests are often denied.

No end in sight to Trump’s trade war

Reuters had reported, however, citing some unnamed US officials, that the Trump administration refrained from putting these 100 companies on the entity list at the last moment, in an attempt to avoid further escalation in the ongoing trade war with China.

Responding to it, Lin Jian, official spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of External Affairs, reiterated during a regular press conference on Wednesday that “the US should stop politicising, instrumentalising and weaponising trade and tech issues.”

“China consistently opposes the US overstretching the concept of national security, abusing its entities list and other export controls, and suppressing Chinese enterprises,” Lin further added.

Monday’s Chinese retaliation is widely considered symbolic too. Most of the companies in the export ban list or procurement ban list have very little or no business with China, according to an Al Jazeera report.

It is speculated that the Chinese move to avoid stronger measures may be an attempt to avert further escalation and to encourage decisions like the one taken by the Trump administration last week to avoid hostile actions against more Chinese firms.

After assuming power for the second time in January last year, Trump resumed the trade war against China that it had started during his first term. It has imposed arbitrary reciprocal tariffs on Chinese goods and restricted the export of high-technology goods to the country, including crucial chips, along with blacklisting some of its major companies.

In retaliation, China has imposed counter tariffs and restricted the export of rare earth materials which are crucial for the defence, auto, and chipmaking industries.

Two consecutive meetings between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, the first in October in South Korea and the second in May in Beijing, as well as a trade deal signed last year have failed to stop the economic war between the world’s two largest economies.

Eleven Nigerien security personnel laid down their lives defending the Diori Hamani International Airport in the capital, Niamey, from an attack by what the defence ministry described as “armed mercenaries in the pay of Emmanuel Macron’s France.” It is the second such attack on the airport in less than five months.

Two civilians were also killed in the attack that started at 6 am on 18 June, when the attackers stormed the entrance in light vehicles.​

“However, the swift response of the Defence and Security Forces (FDS) neutralised the attackers before they reached the airport terminal,” said the defence minister, Salifou Modi, in a televised statement later that day.​

Along with two taxis and a van used in the attack, the security forces also seized several hand grenades, RPG launchers, AK47 rifles, M80 machine guns, and three belts with hundreds of cartridges, VHF handheld radios, and mobile phones.​

After about two hours of battle, they killed 22 attackers and arrested about 20 suspects. Adding that “a large-scale operation … aimed at tracking down and neutralising the remaining elements is underway,” the defence ministry said, however, that the airport itself “is fully secure and remains open to air traffic.”

The Al-Qaeda affiliate, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), has claimed responsibility. The same group is also at war with the state of Mali, which overthrew the French puppet government, expelled French troops in 2022, and severed diplomatic ties with the former coloniser against whom mass protests were raging in the country.​

Burkina Faso followed suit, overthrowing the French-backed government in 2022 and expelling French troops in early 2023. Later that July, when the government propped up by France in Niger was also ousted, the French government initially refused to withdraw its troops and threatened to front a war by other regional countries that remained in its neocolonial grouping, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).​

Despite US President Donald Trump’s untimely threats, which led to the Iranian delegation leaving earlier than their scheduled departure from the first round of quadrilateral negotiations in Switzerland, all parties hailed the talks, claiming they made great progress towards a possible deal.

“Tireless Pakistani and Qatari mediation has delivered major progress to end the Lebanon War,” Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi wrote on X on Monday, 22 June.

“Oil and petrochem exports are waived, the blockade lifted, some frozen assets released, and a major reconstruction & development plan launched for Iran.”

His assurance came hours after his country’s delegation refused to rejoin the talks with the US over the nuclear programme and the lifting of sanctions after spending merely 90 minutes on Sunday at the venue of the talks at Lake Lucerne in Bergenstock in Switzerland.

The Iranian delegation cited repeated threats freshly issued by President Trump during the ongoing talks as the reason for their withdrawal.

Trump, in an early morning social media post on Sunday, threatened to hit Iran “very hard again, just like we did last week, only harder” if it fails to “stop their highly paid proxies in Lebanon from causing trouble.”

A day earlier, during his interview with Fox News, Trump threatened to impose his own tolls on the Strait of Hormuz if Iran “fails” to make a deal within 60 days, as stipulated in the MoU.

Esmail Baghaei, official spokesperson of Iran’s Ministry of External Affairs, also claimed that progress had been made regarding “the issuance of necessary authorisation for Iran’s oil sales and the release of frozen assets.”

He underlined that, despite the Iranian team’s early withdrawal, the technical work for future talks will continue for the remainder of the week, and progress on certain other crucial issues was made.

“The Lake Lucerne summit was conducted in a positive and constructive atmosphere. Encouraging progress has been made, including the creation of a mechanism for further technical talks,” a joint statement issued by mediators Qatar and Pakistan further confirmed on Monday.

US Vice President and head of its delegation in Switzerland J.D. Vance tried to dismiss the Iranian decision to walk out of the talks midway, calling it a “little whining.” He too declared that the talks with Iran actually made “great progress.”

Deconflicting cell on Lebanon

Describing the positive developments during the talks on Sunday, the Qatar-Pakistan joint statement claimed the formation of a “de-confliction cell” with Lebanese participation “to ensure the adherence to the termination of military operations in Lebanon as per the MoU.”

Iran had reiterated time and again that any violation of the ceasefire in Lebanon would invite reactions from it and may halt progress in talks. It repeated the warnings again on Monday.

Israel has maintained that it was not bound by the provisions of the MoU signed by third parties.

The Israeli war in Lebanon played a crucial role in the delay of the first round of the quadrilateral talks in Switzerland, as they were originally scheduled to start on Friday. Iran refused to send its delegation after Israeli forces launched fresh attacks in southern Lebanon.

Iran announced the closure of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz again on Saturday in response to the US failure to stop Israel from launching fresh attacks inside Lebanon in violation of the provisions of the MoU.

However, on Monday, Baghaei hinted at some understanding on the issue of free passage through the Strait of Hormuz as well.

Press TV reported him saying that “parties” are making arrangements for the safe passage of ships through the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran’s nuclear programme and end of sanctions

The negotiations in Switzerland aim to achieve resolutions on issues such as Iran’s nuclear programme and the fate of US sanctions. As per the provisions of the MoU, it needs to be finalised within the next 60 days.

According to Iran, the first round of talks in Switzerland was mostly focused on ensuring the full implementation of US commitments under the MoU.

Without the full implementation of the MoU, including the complete end of the war in Lebanon, “entry into the negotiation phase for the final agreement is not possible,” Baghaei asserted on Monday.

However, Qatar’s and Pakistan’s joint statement claimed the formation of a “high-level committee” to “provide political oversight on the mediation” and oversee the effective implementation of the MoU.

This high-level committee, the joint statement claimed, has already adopted “a roadmap” to reach the final agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme and the lifting of sanctions within the next 60 days.

What if the biggest market story isn’t the one everyone is watching, but the one nobody wants to discuss? There is a fascinating disconnect unfolding in global markets right now. On the surface, everything seems orderly: a diplomatic breakthrough with Iran; a rocket company soaring to the stars; retail investors euphoric. But beneath this exterior, something else is stirring—something that has little to do with “geopolitics for dummies” or “space tourism:” the oil market is far from okay, and perhaps it was never meant to be.

The Silent Squeeze

Let’s start with a simple fact: the physical oil market is tighter than it has been in years. The storage tanks at Cushing, Oklahoma—America’s primary crude hub—are running dangerously low. Not “we should watch this” low, but “we’re approaching the operational floor” low. The last time inventories were this depleted, prices went haywire. That was “Covid 2020,” but in reverse. Back then, storage was overflowing and prices collapsed, briefly into negative territory. Today, the opposite dynamic is at play: there isn’t enough crude to go around, and the futures market is contorting itself into backwardation so steep it’s practically a warning siren (“backwardation” is when near-term prices are higher than future prices; it signals an acute physical shortage and the market desperately bidding for immediate delivery).

Every Wednesday, the Energy Information Administration releases its storage data, and every week the numbers have been worse than expected. In this respect, the diplomatic theatre with Iran was timed suspiciously well, with MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) announced just as the latest drawdown hit the wires. A coincidence? Possibly. But the market isn’t exactly buying it. The “peace premium” evaporated almost as quickly as it appeared, and the front-month contract continues to trade at a stubborn premium to future months (this means that the contract for delivery next month is more expensive than contracts for later months, the opposite of a “normal” market where future prices are higher to account for storage costs; it is the market’s way of screaming “we need oil NOW”). The barrel is physical reality. The mask is narrative, a story so captivating that it allows investors to ignore the constraints gathering underneath it.

Enter the Rocket

Now, pivot to what the world is actually watching: SpaceX. The “IPO of the century” has been nothing short of spectacular—a retail frenzy of truly historic proportions. In its first days of trading, SpaceX options set records. Retail investors poured in, and the company briefly surpassed Microsoft in market capitalization, despite generating a fraction of the revenue. Well, let’s call this “the mask” (or, more fittingly, Musk’s mask). Because here’s the detail that gets lost in the euphoria: only a sliver of SpaceX shares is actually available for trading. The float is tiny—around 5%—and the rest is locked up, waiting for a release date in mid-August. When that happens, a wave of insider shares could hit the market. But that’s a problem for later. For now, the rocket is the story that is drowning out everything else.

What is being drowned out? Quite a lot—starting with artificial intelligence. The AI narrative has been a pillar of the bull market, but the economics are starting to fray. OpenAI, the poster child of the revolution, is losing billions: $21 billion in losses against $13 billion in revenue last quarter. Microsoft, its largest supporter, is scaling back commitments. It has walked away from a $3 billion cloud lease and is exploring cheaper, open-source alternatives. Even DeepSeek is reportedly being considered as a lower-cost option. The AI trade has been a story of limitless potential, but the margins continue shrinking. Token costs are down 20% this month alone and computer rental prices are at one-month lows. The AI trade increasingly resembles a classic technological paradox: exploding adoption alongside collapsing unit economics. Investors may eventually discover that these are not the same thing.

Here the risk is not merely that oil prices rise, but that higher energy costs arrive in a market built on optimistic assumptions about growth, inflation, and monetary policy. Shortages become crises especially when they collide with leverage, and modern markets remain heavily dependent on leverage of one form or another.

Hormuz and the Monetary Trap

Today, 20 June, Iran’s military announced it was closing the Strait of Hormuz, because of continued Israeli strikes in Lebanon, which Iran and Hezbollah view as a violation of the ceasefire deal that was supposed to underpin the broader US-Iran agreement. The agreement, it seems, lasted just long enough for markets to believe in it. The BBC’s own reporting captures it perfectly: “The deal between Iran and the United States was always fragile and torturous in the making. Already there are signs it is unravelling.”

By now we all know that the Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most critical oil chokepoint, through which 20% of global oil passes daily. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy issued a stark warning to all vessels: “Do not approach the Strait of Hormuz; otherwise, your security will be jeopardized.” The US military immediately pushed back, claiming that 55 merchant ships had transited and that safe passage remained intact. But while the US is counting barrels in real-time, trying to project calm as the foundation cracks beneath it, the real question is: why does this soap-opera “deal”—already declared and broken multiple times—matter for the monetary game? Because oil is the lynchpin, and the US knows it.

The Federal Reserve is puffing its chest, trying to talk tough on rates. But it has a problem: oil. Crude is the one commodity that is both deeply financialized and fiercely industrial. It is the bridge between Wall Street and Main Street. And because of that, it is the Fed’s favourite scapegoat—as well as its ultimate constraint. When oil spikes, the Fed can say: “Inflation is out of control, we must hike.” When oil crashes, it can say: “Growth is at risk, we must cut.” The price of crude gives the central bank cover for almost any policy decision.

The Asymmetric Trap

Here is the perverse logic at the heart of this game, now supercharged by yet another “Hormuz closure” headline. Things could still develop as follows:

1. Iran closes the Strait. Oil supply is disrupted. Prices spike.

2. The US economy, already fragile, faces a stagflationary shock. Higher energy costs = higher inflation + lower growth.

3. The Fed, despite all the chest-puffing, cannot hike into a supply-driven oil shock. Doing so would accelerate the recession and break the financialised economy entirely.

4. So the only way out is down. The US must “accept” a recession that kills demand and cools prices. Once the recession is confirmed, the Fed pivots—cutting rates and injecting stimulus to manage the fallout. Covid 2.0.

This is the game within the game. The US needed the latest “Iran deal” to buy time and manage market psychology. But you cannot negotiate with material reality: oil is real and its shortage is even more so. However, what policymakers can do is use physical reality to justify decisions they already wish to make.

So now the central bank is signalling hikes, and the market is pricing them in. But if oil spikes hard enough on the back of a confirmed and continued Hormuz closure, the economy will buckle, and the Fed will have no choice but to pivot fast. That means the hawkish rhetoric is vulnerable to a single and highly manipulable variable: crude. The real game is about the survival of an over-leveraged, hyper-financialised economy. And survival, in this context, requires lower rates.

The Unwinding

Where does this end? Perhaps the mid-August lockup triggers a bout of volatility that forces the Fed to blink. Perhaps the oil market decides it has had enough of geopolitical farces and reprices to reflect the physical reality. Perhaps the AI margin compression becomes too obvious to ignore, and the retail euphoria fades. Or perhaps the rocket keeps flying, the Hormuz closure tightens to then untighten, and the silence continues. But silence is just noise deferred, not safety.

The game is far from over. It has not even reached its most “interesting” chapter. And now the final act might be unfolding faster than anyone expected.

Colombian activist and influencer Beto Coral was detained in his home in Phoenix, Arizona by federal agents from Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) on Tuesday, 16 June. When federal agents arrived at his home on Tuesday, they informed him that his work permit had expired and, as such, he was being detained. In public statements given by spokespersons from the Department of Homeland Security, they allege that Coral is an “illegal alien” and had overstayed his tourist visa.

Since his detention, Beto, whose full name is Franklin Humberto Coral Garrido, has been moved around to several different detention centres; he has alleged facing torture and was also held incommunicado after his first days in detention.

Tatiana Camacho, the mother of Coral’s son, tells BreakThrough News in an exclusive interview that his detention is not simply a case of overstaying a visa, as right-wing media in the United States and Colombia are making it out to be. In fact, she detailed that since Coral first arrived in the United States in 2015, he immediately began his petition for asylum, having fled the country after facing threats to his life. When he was being detained by DHS, he presented them with a folder with all of the documents from his 10-year-long case petitioning for asylum in the US. His work permit, which he was told was expired, was valid until 2028. “That’s the first inconsistency we find,” she told BT.

What then is behind the targeting of the activist and media personality?

Detention ordered by Marco Rubio

“They showed me the letter, and it’s a direct letter, a direct order from Marco Rubio,” Coral told Camacho on the first night of his detention.

The New York Times gained access to the memo written by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio declaring that Coral is “deportable.” The memo acknowledges Coral’s pending asylum petition but says, “Coral Garrido has used his presence in the United States to conduct political activity in support of the Petro government.”

The memo outlines that the reason behind the decision is Coral’s political activism and his strong criticisms of US-backed far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella. De la Espriella, a far-right lawyer who has vowed to disembowel the left, will face off against progressive Colombian politician Iván Cepeda this Sunday, 21 June, in the presidential run-off.

“Allowing Coral Garrido to remain in the United States … undermines US foreign policy interests in Colombia’s democratic processes and signals that foreign nationals may use US platforms to conduct politically motivated disinformation campaigns and litigation targeting foreign democratic actors without consequence,” Rubio wrote.

The “disinformation campaigns” Rubio refers to are the activism that Beto has done on social media through interviews and content creation regarding diverse social and political topics in Colombia. From demystifying corruption scandals to explaining candidates' platforms in the ongoing electoral contest in his home country, Beto has become a leading voice and dependable source for Colombians at home and in the diaspora. He also ran for the seat in Colombia’s House of Representatives for Colombians abroad, a seat that means engaging in Colombian politics whilst abroad, the very “crime” that Rubio seems to have a problem with.

However, the main problem with his work for Washington, it would seem, is not engaging in politics at all, but rather who he supports. In fact, in a recent trip to Miami, Coral exposed how right-wing groups were spreading misinformation against the Colombian government and campaigning in front of a polling centre, in violation of Colombian electoral law.

Coral, meanwhile, emphasising his distance from the polling station, held up signs condemning De la Espriella for his role in corruption schemes. According to his posts, people frequently called the police demanding he be removed, and many people responded to his posts calling for him to be deported.

On the morning of 16 June, the day that Coral was detained, de la Espriella posted on X, “There will be good news for Colombia and for patriotic Colombians abroad. Dura lex, sed lex (Latin for 'the law is harsh, but it is the law') … Coming soon. (A.D.L.E.).”

He accompanied the post with an image (likely AI-generated) of a night sky with two projected images: on the left, an eagle with a flag of the US on a shield and the tagline “the one who takes away visas” and on the right, a tiger head with the tagline “tiger sign.”

The on-the-nose post by de la Espriella has been interpreted by many as a confession that he in fact was informed that Coral would be detained by DHS, though he hasn’t commented on it directly. Interestingly enough, the right-wing lawyer is a naturalised US citizen and has been campaigning heavily with Colombians abroad and right-wing US legislators and officials. Coral and de la Espriella had been at the centre of a public controversy last month when the latter published a recording of a phone call between the two regarding diverse political issues, in violation of Florida law, which requires two-party consent for recording.

Torture, uncertainty, and silence

The irregularities have only continued since being in ICE detention. Camacho told BT that in the few conversations they have been able to have, Coral has complained of severe mistreatment and physical and psychological torture, including beatings, being tied up with chains, being submerged in water, and agents demanding he sign deportation orders under duress.

“This isn’t fair. Why are they treating me like this?” he asked Camacho.

In the days since his detention, Coral has also been moved around between multiple detention centres in multiple states. For a nearly two-day period, he was completely incommunicado, causing his family members and supporters to worry. He has also had issues securing legal representation due to the constant changes in where he is being held.

Like many asylum seekers, the threat of deportation is serious. Coral left Colombia in 2015 and sought asylum precisely because, according to him, the threats against his life were too many and too serious. For many years, he has been researching to find out the truth behind the assassination of his father, Humberto Coral Caballero, who participated in the police operation to find and kill Pablo Escobar in 1993. His research has made him many enemies of the still-powerful drug trafficking mafias in Colombia. Camacho told BT, her voice shaking, “The risk to his life is imminent if he were to return to Colombia. It is something that cannot happen right now.”

Outrage in Colombia and the US

Coral’s detention has sparked widespread outrage from politicians in both Colombia and the United States.

US Representative from Massachusetts Jim McGovern said in a statement that he was “very troubled by allegations of coordination between American officials and Colombian political actors in this arrest—that would amount to our government aiding and abetting transnational repression.”

Colombian President Gustavo Petro has raised his concerns over the detention of Coral and demanded that the US government respect his rights and due process: “The president of the Republic of Colombia demands that the president of the US tell the people of Colombia where Alberto Coral, the son of the Colombian police official that discovered where the biggest drug trafficker in the world of cocaine was, Pablo Escobar, is.”

In another message, the Colombian president “asked all governments in the world and human rights organisations in the world to stand in solidarity to release the prisoner of conscience Alberto Coral.”

He stated clearly that, “Beto is being politically persecuted for being a journalist and expressing opinions that are different from the candidate with powerful friends linked to drug trafficking, the genocide in Gaza, and the far right in Florida.”

For Camacho, the intent of his detention is clear in the result. “Beto’s voice has been silenced these days, even though Beto himself thinks it isn’t important … his voice has carried further than maybe even Beto himself realises.”

As Colombians head into a polarised electoral process, Coral’s detention sets a dangerous precedent, threatening the fundamental civil liberties of people in Colombia and the United States.

After the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with Iran on Wednesday, 17 June, the United States has reportedly begun lifting its naval blockade of the country. Vice President JD Vance said that over a dozen ships have reached Iranian ports in a White House briefing on 18 June. The US naval blockade, however, has had deadly consequences as recently as last week.

On 10 June, the US military killed three Indian sailors in an airstrike on a commercial oil tanker off the coast of Oman. At least three such US strikes on commercial tankers sailed by Indian crews have been reported in the region last week as part of the naval blockade.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) had accused the vessel of violating its blockade, claiming attacks were launched after it “failed to comply with directions from American forces.” Beyond the three killed, twenty-one other Indian crew members were rescued after the attack. Several of them were injured.

Meanwhile, the operator of “MT Settebello” stated that the vessel held no affiliation with Iran or Iranian oil.

Though the Indian government called a senior US embassy official and protested the killings, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio refused to express any remorse. He instead issued a strong warning against any further attempt to violate the naval blockade. Rubio had just visited Delhi last month to improve diplomatic relations.

Left parties in India condemn the US killing of three seafarers.

The left and other opposition groups in India condemned the Narendra Modi-led ultra-right-wing government in the country for failing to uphold the nation’s sovereignty in front of the US and demanded stronger action against its killing of the three Indian seafarers.

In a joint statement issued by five major communist parties in India, they condemned the killing, calling it a violation of the UN charter and the principles of free navigation. They also demanded a formal apology from the US and a formal diplomatic process for ensuring accountability for those responsible.

The signatories include the Communist Party of India (Marxist), the Communist Party of India (CPI), the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation, RSP, and Forward Block.

During his speech at the G7 meeting in France on Tuesday, Modi vaguely and indirectly raised the issue of the killings while Trump was in the audience, without naming the US or the naval blockade.

The US first announced the lifting of the naval blockade it had imposed following the finalisation of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Iran on Monday, 15 June.

Now that the MoU is signed, it has formally ended the war which began with the unprovoked aggression launched jointly by the US and Israel on 28 February against Iran.

The US naval blockade was imposed as a counter to the Iranians blocking the Strait of Hormuz in response to the war. India, like most countries in Asia, relies heavily on the strait for the transit of energy supplies and other essential commodities.

A junior partner to the US

The Indian opposition questioned the Modi government’s “meek response” to the killings and accused it of acting like a “junior partner” to the US who has surrendered the country’s sovereignty and independence.

“The US is acting like a gangster trying to impose its hegemony over the entire world,” the left parties' statement said, claiming that the “BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party]-led union government is abjectly failing in its duty by reneging on the independent foreign policy and becoming a junior partner to the US.”

The government’s “failure to force an apology from the US is the latest example” of its inability to protect India’s national interests from the Donald Trump administration’s consistent attacks.

India’s opposition has repeatedly questioned the Modi government’s failures to object to the Trump administration’s approach towards the country, calling it an “affront to India’s sovereignty and self-respect.”

From the imposition of arbitrary tariffs to threats to impose sanctions if India bought oil from Russia or Iran to Trump’s repeated attempts to take credit for the ceasefire with Pakistan last year, the Indian opposition has found several occasions where the Modi government has shown reluctance to stand against what they call deliberate “humiliation.”

Largely seen as an attempt to please the Trump administration, India had abstained from condemning the US-Israeli aggressions against Iran as well, despite the war affecting its energy supplies and causing significant economic damages.

Calling Prime Minister Modi “compromised” and an “obedient servant” of the US, Rahul Gandhi, the leader of the opposition in the Indian parliament, expressed doubts about the government’s ability to run the country’s foreign policy independently.

The opposition, including the left parties, had also criticised the Modi government’s failure to condemn the sinking of the Iranian ship “IRS Dena” in March in an attack carried out by the US Navy in the Indian Ocean.

More than 80 Iranian sailors were killed in the US attacks on Dena. Iran too had questioned the silence of the Indian government over the incident, pointing out that the ship was a guest of India when attacked.

In their statement on Monday, the communist parties demanded that “as an important country of the Global South, India should condemn US imperialist aggression” and “should lead the voices of the Global South in standing against the US.”

The left parties also called for mass protests against the US acts of aggression and the Indian government’s failure to protect the country’s basic national interests.

G7 leaders met in Évian, France, from 15 to 17 June to discuss—in their own words—“geopolitical issues” and “mutually beneficial international partnerships.” In the days leading up to the summit, a counter-meeting was organised in nearby Geneva, followed by a mass demonstration against the Global North’s warmongering and exploitation of the Global South.

The heads of state from the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Germany, France and Canada and representatives of the European Union addressed pressing global issues but maintained their standard biased vision. Notably, their official statements praised recent initiatives by US President Donald Trump while once again failing to name partner countries involved in gross human rights abuses.

They welcomed the understanding between Iran and the US—“secured under the strong leadership of President Trump”—framing it as an opportunity to “prevent Iran from acquiring any nuclear weapon and tackle the threats related to its regional and ballistic activities.” It seems their discussion made no mention of the Trump administration’s initiation of the latest war on Iran.

A similarly flawed approach appeared in their observations on the war in Ukraine, attacks on Lebanon, and the genocide in Gaza, where they again avoided mentioning Israel. “In Gaza, we will accelerate humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and the swift implementation of relevant political and security measures,” G7 leaders stated, looking away from Israel’s ongoing harassment of the Strip’s population.

Discussions also produced statements on international development and cooperation and critical minerals, reflecting the same economic vision promoted by the G7 in the past. This includes an emphasis on international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and warnings against countries straying from West-approved mechanisms to protect their sovereignty.

“We express our grave concerns regarding the use of non-market policies and practices and economic coercion, including arbitrary export restrictions and retaliatory measures on critical minerals and their dual-use items, all of which undermine economic security and resilience,” the group wrote in another statement.

As these statements were being discussed, the European Parliament approved an EU-US trade arrangement that imposes tariffs on EU exports to the US. European G7 members apparently did not view this agreement, nor the Trump administration’s aggressive negotiating tactics since 2025, as coercive, problematic or a “non-market practice.”

Critical minerals featured prominently in the meeting outcomes, pointing to their importance in current trade and development agreement negotiations, as well as Western endeavours against governments in the Global South who are not aligned with their agenda.

Alongside this focus, presidents and prime ministers promoted the private sector’s role in all areas of life, including in the development of protective equipment and treatment for the current Ebola outbreak in the DRC and Uganda. They also insisted on austerity. “Countries with large and persistent external deficits should undertake policies that include supporting domestic savings and fiscal consolidation,” the G7 statement for “more balanced, durable, resilient growth” reads.

Anti-imperialist and other progressive groups mobilised against the G7 agenda long before the meeting, culminating in a 30,000-strong demonstration in Geneva on Sunday, 14 June. The NOG7 network, a coalition of approximately 50 organisations involved in the counter-programme, described it as a message of social justice sent to the world. “NOG7 has defended the honour of this city and, at least in part, the idea of an internationalist Geneva,” they said.

The mobilisation faced extreme repression from local authorities and police, with activists reporting tear gas and other forms of violence. “The worst part was that they kept hundreds of people in a park for the whole night,” an activist from the People’s Health Movement (PHM) told BreakThrough News. “There were protesters and unrelated people in that park—tourists, hospitality workers—and they were all stuck there from 8 pm to 6 am. There were no bathrooms; the police only gave water and blankets at 1 am.”

At the protest and counter-conference on 12 to 13 June, activists debunked the G7's agenda as ongoing Western imperialism, offering an alternative vision rooted in international solidarity, antifascism, and economic alternatives. Speakers included local BDS groups, feminist and student collectives, and workers' organisations, all calling out the Global North’s war and militarisation agenda.

“International cooperation is crumbling amid an arms race and trade wars,” NOG7 wrote in its call to action. “This imperialism is based on the proliferation of wars, most recently in Iran, Venezuela, Gaza, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Ukraine. Predation by the G7 countries—but also by Switzerland—occurs through their multinational corporations as they race for dwindling raw materials. This frenzied extractivism exploits the bodies of peoples of the Global South.”

“To secure their profits, G7 leaders team up with the capitalist class to intensify their usual strategies: lengthening working hours, raising the retirement age, slashing wages, raising rents, and dismantling public services and social protections,” the coalition wrote, adding that the group is still weaponising debt in the Global South, “exporting policies of public spending cuts and privatisation.”

The authenticity of the public articulation of the stunning proposal of an alliance by Majlis speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf—“regional bloc”—built around an Iran-China axis in the Middle East is not in doubt. Qalibaf has emerged as a powerful figure in the recent weeks in Tehran, next only to the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei in Iran’s policymaking hierarchy. Qalibaf has been recently designated as the country’s Special Representative for China.

Qalibaf was speaking in Tehran on Wednesday at a meeting with a visiting Chinese delegation just two days before the signing ceremony scheduled for Friday at Geneva for the Iran-US Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) where he and Vice-President JD Vance were to have represented their countries respectively. (There is some rethink going on about the need for a formal signing ceremony in Geneva on Friday at all now that document has been digitally signed by President Donald Trump and President Masoud Pezeshkian on Wednesday, formally ending the war.)

To quote Qalibaf, “We need blocs [in the emergent regional and international situation]; I am making it clear that these blocs must be formed and have been formed to some extent. In any bloc that emerges, there are two definitive and irreplaceable countries in all areas: China and Iran.”

Simply put, all is not well with the MoU. Unlike the anodyne expressions by Moscow welcoming the MoU, Xinhua carried on Wednesday an “explainer” highlighting the US-Iranian differences. Xinhua commented, “Despite widespread viewing of the agreement as an important step toward peace, it does not resolve the underlying disputes, leaving the future trajectory of U.S.-Iran relations and the regional situation still shrouded in uncertainty.”

To be sure, Beijing has a profound sense of involvement with regard to the provisions of the MoU ending the war. In particular, the operative part in regard of the regime for the Strait of Hormuz concerns China’s core interests of energy security. Whereas, Moscow is more focused on the respite that the Steve Witkoff—Jared Kushner negotiating team would now have to turn their attention to the Ukraine issue. Moscow is pressing for an early visit by Witkoff and Kushner to the Kremlin to meet President Vladimir Putin, who urged Trump in this regard.

That said, Russian media also has been forthright in voicing scepticism about the efficacy of the MoU. Izvestia wrote: “Moscow noted that Tehran, Washington, and the mediators, working together, managed to defuse a conflict that threatened to ignite the entire region. However, the document [MoU] remains controversial, and Israel has stated that it does not plan to adhere to the letter of the agreement. Therefore, there is a possibility that the deal will fall apart again. Even if Iran and the US sign the memorandum, their path to a real agreement will remain arduous… Washington has failed to achieve the main goal of its military campaign—provoking regime change in the Islamic Republic.

“Be that as it may, a bad peace is better than a good war. Both Washington and Tehran understand this. Therefore, they strive to stabilise relations and reach lasting agreements—even while certain minor disagreements persist… the mediators jointly managed to contain a conflict that threatened to ignite the entire region. And although the path to a final settlement is long and arduous, a start has been made in the search for constructive solutions.”

Nonetheless, the MoU will not have a direct impact on Russia. First of all, Moscow is not dependent on the Strait of Hormuz, although its opening could slightly reduce oil prices. Indeed, Russia has benefited from rising oil prices, but a long-term, protracted conflict in the Persian Gulf carries more risks than benefits, both for the global economy and for any participant in the global market, including Russia.

The expert opinion in Moscow is that a sharp drop in prices is not to be expected. Simply put, the market has the foresight to determine that the Hormuz closure is still a possibility, so this risk will now have to be factored into oil prices.

After the current crisis, Persian Gulf countries will more actively seek new routes to reduce their dependence on this artery. Riyadh already operates the East-West pipeline to the Red Sea, and Abu Dhabi has the Habshan-Fujairah route to the Gulf of Oman. The UAE is accelerating construction of a new pipeline to Fujairah to increase exports bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. But other Gulf producers, including Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, and Bahrain, remain far more vulnerable to the Hormuz bottleneck.

Both Moscow and Beijing will anticipate an accelerated militarisation of the region, as the Persian Gulf countries have had a first hand experience for of the US’s inability to protect them from Iranian strikes. The signing of the MoU will not diminish the sense of urgency among the regional states to strengthen their air defences and their own military capabilities. Of course, Beijing and Moscow as arms exporters will strive to secure a slice of the pie.

The bottomline is that neither China nor Russia expects the MoU to end the conflict; rather, they would visualise that at best, the framework of the MoU will give the protagonists a pause. Much will depend on how the protagonists will use the current interlude to work proactively for the beginning of a durable settlement—or, on the contrary, preparation for a new round of escalation.

Meanwhile, the G7 leaders' statement on geopolitical issues following the summit meeting devoted a hefty portion to the Middle East developments, couched in a somewhat tendentious tone while also harmonising the respective stances of the US and its G7 allies. Interestingly, Trump sat through the tiresome proceedings of the 2-day G7 summit.

An operative part of the G7 statement is the agreement that “the multinational, independent, and defensive initiative led by France and the UK can play an important role to facilitate the resumption of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz by protecting merchant vessels, reassuring commercial shipping operators, and supporting verification that all mines are removed.”

To be sure, the G7 continues to visualise Iran as a disruptive force, while, on the other hand, Tehran will resent the intrusiveness of the E-3 [France, Britain and Germany]. It is useful to recall in this context that the E-3 were as much responsible for the death of the JCPOA as Trump was.

Against such a tumultuous backdrop, it should not come as a surprise that Qalibaf mooted the idea of a “regional bloc” between Iran and China. Coincidence or not, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi also had a telephonic conversation with his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araghchi on Wednesday to express solidarity with Iran.

A Xinhua report stated that Wang reaffirmed that “China has always supported Iran’s reasonable and legitimate claims and its efforts in safeguarding its own sovereignty and security.” Wang stressed in particular that the issue of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz “should be properly addressed.” He offered that “China is ready to strengthen communication, coordination with Iran, and will continue to contribute to regional peace and stability.”

Notably, from among the Persian Gulf states, only the UAE and Qatar were invited to the G7 summit—or, perhaps, accepted the G7 invitation. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman were conspicuous by their absence. Conceivably, Wang Yi is cut out for a pivotal role as unifier in the uncertain times ahead.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is facing perhaps the most precarious moment of his political career. He knows it. His allies know it. And his rivals—both within his coalition and across Israel’s political spectrum—are preparing to capitalize on his growing weakness.

Former Israeli Justice Minister Haim Ramon, who also served as deputy prime minister between 2007 and 2009, is among the latest Israeli political figures to join a growing chorus of criticism directed at Netanyahu.

“In the final result,” Ramon said in an interview with Radio Galey, cited by the Israeli outlet Srugim, “we did not win.” He then broke down that failure in blunt terms: “We did not win in Lebanon, we did not win in Iran, and we did not win against Hamas.”

Another prominent critic is former Israeli army chief Gadi Eisenkot, who joined Netanyahu’s emergency war government following the events of 7 October 2023, before resigning with Benny Gantz in June 2024.

Beyond accusing Netanyahu of failing to protect Israel on 7 October, Eisenkot argues that the prime minister has effectively surrendered Israel’s political decision-making to US President Donald Trump, thereby strategically weakening Israel.

Ironically, Netanyahu’s coalition partners have often been even more opportunistic than the opposition.

Since the formation of the current coalition government on 29 December 2022—widely regarded as the most right-wing government in Israel’s history—figures such as National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich have repeatedly used Netanyahu’s political vulnerability to expand their own influence. Whenever Netanyahu needed political support to remain in power, they demanded concessions in return.

For Israel’s far-right extremists, Netanyahu’s inability to secure decisive strategic victories has often translated into opportunities to advance their own agendas. Every setback on the battlefield became an opening for greater settlement expansion, harsher measures against Palestinians, and deeper entrenchment of extremist policies.

Unable to deliver “victory,” Netanyahu turned perpetual war into a political strategy in its own right. The result has been a genocidal war in Gaza, widespread devastation in Lebanon, and a dangerous confrontation with Iran that has repeatedly brought the region to the brink of a wider catastrophe.

For a time, this formula proved politically sustainable. Netanyahu successfully enlisted unwavering US support to keep the fires of war burning. At the same time, the failure of Europe and much of the international community to hold a wanted war criminal accountable provided him with the political space necessary to continue his bloody calculations.

Yet that formula may be nearing its limits. While this possibility may appear encouraging, it comes with a serious warning. If Netanyahu can no longer sustain the wars that have prolonged his political life for nearly three years, he may escalate where resistance is weakest: the occupied West Bank.

Regarding Iran, there is growing recognition that the current confrontation is unsustainable indefinitely and that some form of arrangement will eventually emerge. Likewise, regardless of whether Lebanon is formally included in any future agreement, Israel’s ambition of permanently occupying parts of Lebanese territory remains untenable.

Historically, when Israel fails to secure a strategic breakthrough on one front, it seeks compensation on another—typically where Palestinians are most vulnerable and where international scrutiny is weakest.

As Israeli elections approach, it is therefore reasonable to fear a further escalation of the genocide in Gaza, pushing both the death toll and the level of destruction to new heights. According to Gaza health authorities, nearly 1,000 Palestinians have been killed since the ceasefire agreement was announced in October, bringing the overall death toll of Israel’s genocide in Gaza to 73,000 Palestinians.

Though Israel’s war has already failed to break Palestinian steadfastness, the broader objective remains unchanged: the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Gaza and the transformation of the Strip into a space that can no longer sustain Palestinian life.

The West Bank, however, presents a different challenge.

There, Israel faces a fragmented political landscape and a Palestinian Authority that refuses to develop an effective strategy for confronting accelerating Israeli violence, ethnic cleansing, home demolitions, land confiscation, and the relentless expansion of illegal settlements.

This vulnerability has enabled Israel to move from discussing annexation to implementing it in practice. The strategy rests on two interconnected pillars: extreme violence and displacement on the one hand, and rapid settlement expansion on the other.

According to an Oxfam International study published on 12 June, Israel has killed 1,244 Palestinians, including 268 children, in the occupied West Bank since 2023—more than the total number killed during the previous seventeen years combined.

This bloodshed has been accompanied by large-scale displacement that has already uprooted nearly 46,000 Palestinians, many of them from refugee camps and vulnerable communities across the northern West Bank.

An Amnesty International report published on 10 June documented the full or partial displacement of at least 117 Palestinian Bedouin and herding communities between January 2023 and April 2026.

Expectedly, the violence, displacement, settlement expansion, and land seizures are not isolated developments but components of a coherent political project. In September 2025, Smotrich openly proposed the annexation of 82 percent of the occupied West Bank. What was once presented as a political vision is now steadily being translated into facts on the ground.

The era of Netanyahu may be nearing its end, but before this bloody political chapter closes, countless more Palestinians may be forced to bear the cost.

Arab and Muslim countries, along with their allies in the international community, must not wait for Israel to launch a much larger assault on the West Bank before responding.

The matter demands urgent attention and immediate action.

One of the top weapons manufacturers in the world, Lockheed Martin, and automaker General Motors announced on Tuesday, 16 June, a new collaboration to produce critical munitions and other weapons.

Companies claimed the collaboration was a result of the efforts of the US Department of War and the Pentagon, as the Donald Trump administration seeks to “double or triple” the capacity and rate of production of weapons in the country.

“Working under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), Lockheed Martin and GM Defence will explore opportunities to accelerate the delivery of critical capabilities and innovation by combining Lockheed Martin’s defence production expertise with General Motors' advanced industrial capabilities in high-rate commercial manufacturing and engineering,” Lockheed Martin said in a press release.

According to the press release, the collaboration will focus on “strengthening defence supply chains and advancing manufacturing and design capabilities to expand production capacity.”

“This collaboration brings together two leaders in American manufacturing and innovation to explore new ways to strengthen the defence industrial base, expand production capacity and accelerate the delivery of critical capacities” for the US and its allies, said Frank St John, chief operating officer of Lockheed Martin.

Lockheed Martin is one of the largest weapon manufacturers in the world and the largest supplier of weapons to the US Army. It is known as the producer of the F-35, the THAAD air defence system and Black Hawk helicopters, among others.

Though GM has a history of building tanks for the US Army during the Second World War, it has largely retained its status as one of the world’s largest automakers for decades. It re-established its weapon-manufacturing unit called GM Defence only in 2017.

According to the FT, both GM and Lockheed are planning to invest around USD 25 billion in the coming years in separate projects, including research and development, but largely related to the collaboration.

The collaboration is part of the Donald Trump administration’s push for the expanded and accelerated production of weapons in the country, which is already the world’s largest producer and exporter with over a 40% share in the global arms trade.

The Trump administration’s move is a result of the experiences during the joint US-Israeli war against Iran and its weapon supplies in the Ukraine war.

Despite its public denial of reports about the rapidly-dwindling stockpile of weapons and critical munitions following the war with Iran, whose “hot” phase lasted barely over a month, the Pentagon has been looking to enhance weapons manufacturing capacity in the country.

Both companies acknowledged their tie-up was pushed and facilitated by the Pentagon in particular to boost the production of missiles and air defence interceptors.

According to a report in the FT, the Pentagon has urged the defence manufacturers to double or triple the rate of production of critical munitions over the next three to seven years.

Currently critical munitions and missile defence systems usually take around 24 to 36 months to produce.

The Pentagon has reportedly tried to rope in another big automobile manufacturer, Ford, for similar collaboration with other defence manufacturers in the country.