Last year (in August 2025), The Future of the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023 came into force. This purports to protect the freedom of speech of students, academics and external speakers at universities in England, whereby “universities must actively promote academic freedom, ensuring campuses are places where robust discussion can take place without fear of censorship of students, staff or external speakers expressing lawful opinions” (Gov UK, 2025). Though this is surprising given that both the previous Conservative government, who drafted the Act and the present Labour government, who have (with some exclusions) implemented it, are not principled supporters of free speech, nonetheless, this is ostensibly a positive step and should lead the devolved governments in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland to follow suit.
But given the recent history of the reticence, even reluctance, of UK universities to abide by free speech principles, it is by no means certain that they will comply with the new law. Two recent cases of profound importance at the University of Bristol point to important lessons in this regard. It took two academics, David Miller and Steven Greer, to mount strong challenges to the Bristol University management to overturn the sanctions against them that patently violated their academic freedom. Though distinct, the two cases have parallels.
David Miller and “antisemitism”
David Miller was employed by Bristol University as a professor of political sociology until he was dismissed in October 2021 for alleged gross misconduct. One of his research interests is the Zionist movement. Miller argues that the Zionist movement comes at the expense of equal rights for Palestinians and that political Zionism is inherently racist and imperialist (Rahman Lowe Solicitors, 2026).
Complaints against Miller were first made by the Campaigns Officer of Bristol’s Jewish Student Society (J-Soc) in 2019 about Miller’s teaching and research, in which he drew attention to the existence of a Zionist network in Britain, viewing this as “antisemitic.” He later referred to some Jewish student groups as “political lobby groups” and described Jewish students at British universities as “political pawns by a violent, racist foreign regime engaged in ethnic cleansing” and that “Zionism has no place in any society.” These and other related comments led to the disciplinary process and his sacking (BBC News, 2026).
In 2024, David Miller successfully appealed against his sacking at an Employment Tribunal on the grounds of unfair dismissal, breach of contract and discrimination or victimisation on the grounds of religion or belief. Bristol University appealed this verdict, but in August 2026, the President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal (Lord Fairley) dismissed the appeal and found that Miller was discriminated against because of his anti-Zionist beliefs.
The EAT upheld the decision of the Employment Tribunal and concluded that “Dr Miller was discriminated against because of his philosophical belief that Zionism is inherently racist, imperialist, and colonial and ought to be opposed. The EAT held that his anti-Zionist beliefs constitute a protected belief under the Equality Act 2010; he was dismissed because he manifested those beliefs, and as the dismissal was tainted by discrimination, he was unfairly dismissed” (Rahman Lowe Solicitors, 2026).
The EAT stressed that the protection of freedom of speech is particularly important in the case of “political speech”—that is, expression of opinion on matters of public and political interest. It provided this cogent defence of Miller’s political stance:
[I]t is coherent to describe as “racist” an ideology [Zionism] that promotes the establishment of a state [in this case, Israel] for only one race of people [Jewish] in a territory that formerly contained a large number of people of a different race [Palestinians]. Such an ideology, which supports the migration of members of the first group into the territory with the support of an imperial power to dislodge an indigenous population, could also coherently be described as colonial and imperialistic” (Rahman Lowe Solicitors, 2026).
This was a convincing rebuttal of Bristol University’s discriminatory conduct towards David Miller, which had been pushed by Zionist groups, beginning with Bristol’s J-Soc. Furthermore, it was a slap down of the more than 100 MPs who had called for action to be taken against him (BBC News, 2021) and, also, must have been discomfiting to the UK government (be they Conservative or Labour), who are strong defenders of Zionism. It remains to be seen if Bristol University will reinstate Miller to his previous post.
Steven Greer and “Islamophobia”
Steven Greer was employed by Bristol University as a professor specialising in human rights. In 2020, the University of Bristol’s Islamic Society (BRISOC) complained about Greer’s module Human Rights in Islam, China and the Far East. This included discussion of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo shootings and killing of cartoonists and journalists in 2015 and the traditional death penalty for “blasphemy” in Islam. Greer said that as the academic literature on the course debated the “traditional death penalty for blasphemy” in Islam, the attacks could be seen as “an example of freelancers taking it upon themselves to punish somebody by exacting the death penalty” (BBC News, 2023).
One student complained to the law school, and after an exchange of e-mails between Greer and the faculty, he said he would not use the Charlie Hebdo example again. However, this did not satisfy BRISOC, who campaigned against him (including on social media), which Greer said harmed his mental health and that of his family members. He stated that “it was a terrifying experience. If you’re accused of Islamophobia, your life is potentially put at risk - we know that without question. They accused me of laughing at the Quran, for example, of mocking it in class” (BBC News, 2023). Greer felt betrayed for the absence of support from the university and colleagues.
After a five-month investigation, the complaint against Greer was not upheld for the following reasons: “A QC appointed to review and advise on the content of the module found no evidence of Islamophobic speech and concluded that the material did not amount to discrimination or harassment and was intended as the basis for academic debate by the students who elected to study it. In addition, the issues discussed in relation to Islam were within the scope of the curriculum and therefore exempt from constituting harassment or discrimination under the Equality Act 2010” (University of Bristol, 2021).
But, in violation of academic freedom, the composition of the module was significantly changed. In 2023 Greer published a book detailing this sorry saga: Falsely Accused of Islamophobia: My Struggle Against Academic Cancellation.
Unlike David Miller, however, Steven Greer was not sacked, nor did MPs call for action to be taken against him. Hence, he did not require legal assistance to clear his name, whereas Miller had to resort to crowdfunding to raise funds for his defence. This indicates that the charge of “antisemitism” carries greater weight than that of “Islamophobia” in British academia and mainstream political circles and that Zionists can mobilise far more powerful support than Islamists. This seemingly also applies to Academics for Academic Freedom who showed support to Greer (AFAF, 2025) but not to Miller.
Though absolutely in support of both Miller and Greer, I take issue with both their acceptance of the nonsensical, highly contested term “Islamophobia”—for which there is no consensus about its meaning nor a legal definition (on my critique of the term, see Hasan, 2010, ch. 4).
The lesson from these two cases for Bristol University, and this applies to academia in its entirety, is to rigorously follow the principles set out in a lecture delivered in 1966 by then President of the British Academy, Lord Lionel Robbins, on the profound importance of academic freedom to a free society:
For the demand for academic freedom in institutions of higher education is not the same as the demand for freedom of thought and speech in general: it goes considerably beyond that principle. It is not merely a demand that the academic, in his capacity as a citizen, shall be free to think and speak as he likes; it is a demand that, in his employment as an academic, he shall have certain freedoms not necessarily involved in ordinary contractual relations and that the institutions in which he works shall likewise enjoy certain rights of independent initiative not necessarily granted to other institutions which are part of a state system. The one demand, the demand for freedom of thought and speech in general, is, I should hope, a demand which, in its general aspect, would command widespread, if not universal, support in free societies—how otherwise should they call themselves free? (Robbins, 1966, p. 48) (emphasis in original).
