Palestine Action

Inside the Supreme Court Fight Against Proscription

Police officers carry away a detainee outside the UK Supreme Court during a demonstration against the ban on Palestine Action, London, November 4, 2026. Photo credit: Jordan Pettitt

It was a remarkably mild early November morning at 6am as I left the Chelsea Cloisters hotel to get the tube to Westminster and the Supreme Court. I had been worried because I had forgotten to pack my thermal underwear.

I had queued overnight for the Assange hearings, the Salmond trial and the ICJ Genocide case—the latter in minus 5 degrees at The Hague—and thermals were an essential part of the kit. On the first night for the Assange hearings, at Woolwich Crown Court, I stood for seven hours in freezing drizzle with Patrick Henningsen and Randy Credico. Immediately after that first day in court finished, I headed to Mountain Warehouse to buy a large, warm, waterproof jacket.

I found the one I wanted, which was on sale, and tried it on. I then took it to the counter and explained to the young lady that it was labelled XXL, but I couldn’t get the zip to do up. She looked at me coolly and replied, “Fat people don’t climb mountains.”

My ego somehow survived, and now as I approached the Supreme Court, I saw the flashing orange lights of three trucks parked outside and heard the ringing metallic sound of crews putting up metal crowd barriers around the building. I was slightly worried I was late for the queue, but there was only one tall young man sitting on the benches outside. He was a journalism student from City University, and neither of us having anything else to do, he interviewed me.

There were three men in sleeping bags along the front of the court building, one right across the door. We speculated as to whether they were part of the queue or simply homeless. As barriers were clamped into place behind us, we worried where the front of the queue was meant to be. I approached the man wearing a Hi-Vis jacket, who looked in charge. He had long hair and a beard and a friendly, open face. He wore a builder’s helmet, presumably in case the Supreme Court somehow fell on top of him.

“Do you know what the system is for installing these barriers?” I asked.

“I’d be pretty bad at my job if I didn’t,” he replied.

I explained we were the queue. He laughed and said we were fine where we were. About five minutes later the crew left with two-and-three-quarter trucks still full of barriers, presumably to cordon off somewhere else. Their work was inexplicably pointless—they had put pit barriers up against an existing wall, with others randomly dotted on the pavement, and left a thirty-yard gap anybody could walk past to the court on the west side.

I pointed out to Tony this seemed strangely pointless and he said its purpose might become clear later. It didn’t.

His name, incidentally, probably wasn’t Tony. I introduced myself, but he didn’t volunteer a name, so I didn’t press him.

At 7:30am a young lady arrived. She was pleasant and joined our conversation but again did not give her name. She worked for a Westminster lobbying company, so I would assume it was in the Israeli interest. It was 8:45am before a real queue began to gather. Public information had been that doors would open at 9am, and they did—but we were kept standing outside until after 10am.

There was then a great disappointment as an official arrived and told us no members of the public would be admitted to the courtroom. Court No. 1, he explained, has no public gallery, and all the rows of benches would be fully occupied by the legal teams. The public would be allowed into an overspill court, No. 3, where screens were set up.

This was very annoying. It was also later plainly observable on the screens that the official explanation of no seats being available was untrue. Exactly the same thing had happened at the High Court hearing. I have no doubt that “security” was the motivation, and having designated Palestine Action supporters as terrorists, they were determined to treat any of the public interested in the case as potential terrorists.

The building is a very late flowering of Victorian mediaeval revivalist architecture and was originally Middlesex County Council. When the Supreme Court was established a quarter century ago, it was converted to the purpose, the county of Middlesex itself having essentially already been abolished.

It is rather a good building, which is important as a close neighbour to Westminster Abbey. Unfortunately, the principle of open justice had not been applied in its conversion to the creation of public galleries.

Today was the last gasp of the UK legal system in challenging the legality of the proscription of Palestine Action in the case brought by its founder, Huda Ammori. This judicial review had proceeded through the High Court, which found the proscription unlawful, and the Appeal Court, which found it lawful.

As the process went through these courts, the grounds for permitted appeal were whittled down until only one was allowed: whether the effect of the proscription on Article X and XI rights (freedom of speech and freedom of assembly) were disproportionate in terms of what was necessary to protect the public from the terrorist organisation.

Articles X and XI are from the European Convention on Human Rights, enshrined into UK law by the Human Rights Act.

In the Supreme Court they do not wear old horsehair wigs and gowns, including the judges. This felt rather strange, as such a costume had not been worn at all the prior stages. The five judges were situated on a curved dais, with the lines of lawyers below them.

One problem with not being in the real courtroom was that, every time a judge spoke, the camera immediately cut to that judge in close-up. The judges all looked extremely similar—white men aged about sixty in suits and ties. It was very difficult to tell in close-up which judge was which. Some of the identifications in this account are therefore almost certainly wrong, but not deliberate.

When you think about it, in our diverse society, the difficulty of telling Supreme Court judges physically apart is a problem.

Raza Hussain KC opened for Huda Ammori. Raza seemed a much more imposing figure without his wig and gown and spoke with a force and fluency that I had not really seen in full flow in the earlier hearings.

His first point may have been excellent, but as the screens in Court No. 3 had no sound for the first five minutes, I did not catch it. We therefore join him at point number 2.

2) Hussain said that Palestine Action was not a terrorist group but a protest group that takes direct action. He said it could only be caught by stretching the outer limits of the definition of terrorism in the Terrorism Act, a definition which the Supreme Court had already described in an earlier case as “striking in its breadth.”

3) Hussain said that according to the Home Secretary herself, the vast majority of Palestine Action’s activities did not fall within the definition of terrorism. Only 3 actions out of 385 were so described. Yet these three were used to make all fall under terrorism.

4) Unlike other proscribed organisations, the objectives of Palestine Action were in line with the principles of liberal democracy. They simply wished to impede genocide and war crimes.

5) Contrary to the Appeal Court judgement, Palestine Action did fall within the tradition of other direct action groups, such as the suffragettes and environmentalist and animal rights groups, which were not treated as terrorists.

6) Important civil society groups such as Amnesty, Liberty and PEN, and international organisations including UN Special Rapporteurs had expressed opposition to the proscription.

7) Proscription of Palestine Action had wider effects on public confidence in the proscription regime itself and in the Terrorism Act. There was public revulsion at the arrest of over 4,000 for supporting Palestine Action, many of them elderly and distinguished.

8) Proscription of Palestine Action was prone to upset the court’s judgements in many other compatibility cases over the years. (A compatibility case tests whether a law is compatible with the Human Rights Act.) The decision on the proportionality of the effect on civil liberties must itself depend on whether the anterior exercise of the proscription power was proportionate to the alleged threat.

If an elderly and distinguished person arrested for expressing non-violent support for Palestine Action were to win a case against their arrest at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg—he gave the example of an 81-year-old female Christian ex-magistrate arrested at a vigil at a Truro church—that could strike down all the Supreme Court’s previous decisions on Section 13 of the Terrorism Act (expressing support for a terrorist organisation) where other, real terrorist organisations were concerned.

This last was a very good argument I had never heard before, and one tailored to meet the sensibilities of a court with no interest in civil liberties. Maintaining this absurd proscription could ultimately result, by the law of unintended consequences, in more freedom of speech, not less.

Lord Sales now interrupted from the judicial bench to ask whether Hussain’s description of just three terrorist incidents included that at RAF Brize Norton.

Raza Hussain replied that incident did not meet the bar of terrorism. It should rather be seen in the light of the famous Margaret Jones case, which was not assessed by anybody to be terrorism. The anti-militarist tradition is not terrorist.

Lord Sales then asked whether the proportionality exercise should not be conducted by this court on the facts as of now, as opposed to the facts at the initial hearing. Hussain replied that Lord Justice Lewis had ruled at an earlier stage that material that had happened after the initial Divisional (High) Court ruling was not admissible. Lord Stephens asked why the Court of Appeal had made this ruling.

There was a hiatus as everybody in court went through sheaves of papers looking for the answer to this question, but nobody seemed able to find one.

Lord Sales asked why Hussain said Brize Norton was not a terrorist attack. Raza Hussain replied that it was the Secretary of State’s judgement; it was not a terrorist attack. He suggested the government lawyers might explain that. Lord Sales said he was asking Hussain why he would say it was not terrorism. Hussain replied because of the limited amount of damage done and because of the Jones case.

Lord Stephens then interjected that RAF planes had been damaged. Why was that not terrorism? Raza Hussain said that was a precise comparison to the Jones case, which was judged not to be terrorism. The Jones case involved attempted arson at RAF Fairford. The Brize Norton case was merely spraying paint.

Lord Briggs said that surely the seriousness of damage depended on what the paint was sprayed upon. There was a difference between spraying paint on a railing and spraying paint on a Van Gogh.

Lord Sales then asked why it was not for the Supreme Court, but rather the Secretary of State, to decide whether Brize Norton was terrorism.

James Eadie KC for the government intervened to say that the extent of the damage at Brize Norton was the disputed subject of a current criminal trial. But there were other factors to be considered in determining whether an incident was terrorism.

Lord Sales said Raza Hussain appeared to accept it was for this court to determine whether Brize Norton was terrorism.

Raza Hussain suggested that whether one individual act was characterised as terrorism was not determinative of the proportionality of the interference with Article X and XI rights. The definition of terrorism in UK legislation is very broad. The power to proscribe is very broad. The effects of proscription are very severe. The “guardrails” provided by the Convention rights were therefore very necessary.

He outlined the draconian powers of the act, in empowering the police to arrest people on suspicion of supporting Palestine Action, and criminalising speech which could lead somebody else to support Palestine Action, irrespective of whether that was the intention of the speaker.

Lord Stephens asked whether speaking against the proscription of Palestine Action, rather than in support of Palestine Action as such, would be an offence. Raza Hussain replied that people are being arrested for doing exactly that.

Lord Sales asked whether, if he wrote a judgement opposing the proscription of Palestine Action, that would itself be an offence. Raza Hussain replied that on the ground people were being arrested for just opposing proscription, as well as those being arrested specifically for supporting Palestine Action.

Lord Briggs said that people opposing proscription were not necessarily supporting Palestine Action, and therefore there was no offence. Raza Hussain said that it was an offence under the Act to make a statement that gave rise to a suspicion of supporting Palestine Action. People opposing proscription were being arrested for that. These offences carried up to 14 years in jail.

Lord Reid said that if an academic published “I understand why Hamas (also a proscribed organisation) did what they did,” that would not be actionable.

Raza Hussain said people simply do not know what they may or may not say. There is no clear line. That is precisely the chilling effect on free speech.

Raza Hussain next moved on to say that he would address the findings of the Court of Appeal that Palestine Action was not in the tradition of civil disobedience groups and not non-violent. Hussain said this finding was an error of fact and ignored the evidence, including that contained in the various Home Office documents. The Court of Appeal’s characterisation of other movements was ahistorical. In particular, it was simply untrue to say that the suffragettes only engaged in non-violent and overt campaigning.

His submission was that Palestine Action never advocated violence. He accepted that there had been a few isolated instances of violence, but these were not deliberate.

The context was important, and the context was the enormous suffering of the Palestinian people. The aims of Palestine Action were to prevent jus cogens breaches of international law by Israel, including war crimes, apartheid and genocide.

The Court of Appeal had stated that the complicity of Elbit Systems in Israeli war crimes “must be a matter of contention,” but it was not in fact open to contention. Elbit describes itself as the backbone of the Israeli Defence Force. It is Israel’s main supplier of weapons.

The International Court of Justice had issued interim measures against Israel in the Genocide case. The International Criminal Court had issued warrants for both the Prime Minister of Israel and the former Defence Minister. These were indisputable facts.

An organisation such as Palestine Action with the aim of countering this illegality was clearly in the honourable tradition of British direct action.

There were many precedents, such as the Animal Liberation Front, Extinction Rebellion, and Just Stop Oil, as well as anti-hunting and anti-GM food groups, who used very similar tactics to Palestine Action and were not terrorists.

Lord Sales interrupted to say that this was not an admissible argument. Palestine Action’s ground that the proscription was unfairly discriminatory against Palestinians had been refused, and permission to appeal on this point had been refused.

Raza Hussain continued that the tactics employed by Palestinian Action were commonplace. The Greenham Common women and Trident Ploughshares stood in the same tradition.

Lord Sales interrupted again to ask why this argument was different from a claim of discrimination, which was not allowed?

Lord Sales looks like an uglier version of Toby Young, which rather surprised me, as I had not realised that “Uglier than Toby Young” existed, even as a theoretical concept. He is very much from the Tony Blair stable and was a protégé of Tony Blair’s mate, Lord Gerry Irvine KC.

Sales represented the Blair government in opposing a judicial review into the decision to start the illegal invasion of Iraq, on the grounds that judges should not interfere in ministerial decisions on national security.

They say that true beauty emanates from inside, from the soul. Lord Sales proves that you can get true ugliness that way too.

Raza Hussain tried to plough on despite Sales’s interventions. The suffragettes had engaged in firebombing, arson and serious property damage. They planned such events in secret. But history viewed them as vindicated. This is because, like Palestine Action, they had a legitimate aim. Unlike other proscribed organisations the aims of Palestine Action in stopping genocide were entirely compatible with the ideals of a liberal democracy.

The aim of proscription was to prevent the actions described in Section 1 and Section 3 of the Terrorism Act. The necessity of the proscription must strike a fair balance with its impact on statutory Article X and XI rights. Was there a need for proscription? Elbit’s property rights were protected by the full range of criminal law and not just by Sections 1 and 3.

The aim of proscription must be limited to preventing actions which fell under Sections 1 and 3, not to disrupting the vast majority of Palestine Action’s activities which did not meet the definition of terrorism. Proscription was being used to prevent acts which the government simply considered as irritants. In the proportionality exercise it must be considered that they are preventing Palestine Action’s activities as a whole, not just those which fell under Sections 1 and 3.

Raza Hussain then handed over to Henry Blaxland KC to tackle the Home Office claim of “an escalating pattern of violence.”

Henry Blaxland said that the question to be asked is whether the criminal law is equipped to deal with Palestine Action without proscription. The state should not prematurely exercise a power to prevent crime. Sweeping preventative powers was a fundamental change to the order of a liberal democracy.

There were many charges in the criminal law which could be and had been used against Palestine Action activities. These included criminal damage, burglary, aggravated burglary, assault and violent disorder.

Lord Sales interrupted, saying that criminal law might not prevail. You might not catch the criminal. If you did catch them, then it might be difficult to prosecute and bring witnesses. The fundamental criticism of the Divisional (High) Court by the Court of Appeal was that they did not accord due respect to the constitutional position and democratic mandate of the Secretary of State in making this judgement.

Lord Stephens asked if the criminal law is a sufficient deterrent. It may be like director disqualification when a company goes bankrupt—it was no real deterrent at all.

Blaxland continued that the proscription was an excessive reaction to a particular problem. They should look at the three cases on which the determination of terrorism was made.

Lord Stephens asked whether the three cases included Brize Norton. Blaxfield replied no, but he would come on to it.

In the Thales factory case in Scotland, six defendants had climbed onto the roof of the building and were supported by a crowd gathered outside. There was no attempt to escape, and all six had pleaded guilty to breach of the peace. They received 12-month prison sentences, with one getting an extra 2 months.

This was not assessed as a terrorist action by the police at the time, nor by the Scottish Counter Terrorism Board (CONTEST). It was only later elevated to one of three instances of terrorism. But nobody was hurt.

The second “terrorism” case, the June 2024 action at the Instro Precision factory in Sandwich, Kent, was still being tried at the Old Bailey. In this action the protestors had been divided into black (covert) and red (overt) teams.

The black team had protested outside and provided a diversion before making good their escape, while the red team had entered the factory to cause damage and had intentionally been arrested. This was being tried under criminal law with charges of threatening behaviour, burglary, violent disorder and criminal damage.

The third case was at the Elbit factory at Filton, Bristol in August 2024. Here the black team trial was in progress, and the red team trial had concluded. One security guard and one police officer had been injured.

This had been charged as aggravated burglary, but all were acquitted of that. The charge of GBH with intent had also been acquitted. There was a conviction of GBH with no intent. The judge had found that the action had a “terrorist connection,” which increased sentencing. Jail sentences were very substantial, of six to eight years.

Filton had been a watershed for Palestine Action. The arrests had been made under Section 21 of the Terrorism Act, and all had been remanded in custody for 18 months before trial. This was not dependent upon proscription and was before proscription. It had changed how Palestine Action operated thereafter.

On the Appeal Court’s assessment that these were covert actions:

• At Thales there was no attempt to avoid arrest.
• At Instro Precision the black team evaded arrest, but the red team had volunteered for arrest.
• At Filton all were arrested, and the Red Team had volunteered for arrest.

The actions were not covert. The point of the action was to gather publicity for their cause by volunteering for arrest.

Lord Stevens asked where he could see that they volunteered for arrest.

Blaxland replied this has been plain from the evidence at trial, where they received substantial custodial sentences. That was the meaning of the designations “overt” and “covert.”

Lord Sales said that the Court of Appeal went well beyond the question of avoiding arrest. They spoke of Palestine Action’s hidden funding, its cell structure, and of Ms Ammori’s lack of transparency.

Henry Blaxland replied that Palestine Action was an open organisation. It had a website. It held Training Days and Open Days which anybody could attend.

Lord Sales responded that Palestine Action had a cell structure. Blaxland countered that when it came to the serious incidents on which reliance is placed, they volunteered themselves for arrest.

Lord Lloyd Jones asked about the injury to the police officer. Blaxland stated it was not intentional, and it was subject to a criminal appeal. After the Filton Palestine Action, they confined themselves to action which entailed only low-level criminality.

Lord Stephens asked about Brize Norton. Blaxland replied that Brize Norton was the exception that proved the rule.

The proper comparator was with the Margaret Jones case. That action had involved actual damage to refuelling tankers, with an intention and equipment to damage aircraft by arson. The resulting sentences for the two defendants had been merely a curfew order and conditional discharge.

Lord Sales said that the Jones case was serious criminality. How did comparison to that help Blaxland’s case?

Blaxland replied that there had been no suggestion that the Jones case was terrorism.

Lord Stephens interjected that it plainly was terrorism. It involved serious damage to property.

Blaxland replied that there was no suggestion that the defendants in the Jones case should be described as terrorists or treated as terrorists.

Lord Sales said that the Jones case was prosecuted. This criminality was not tolerated.

Blaxland replied it was prosecuted, but not as terrorism. If he might move on with his argument, at Brize Norton, rather than arson, two aircraft had been sprayed with paint.

Lord Lloyd Jones asked which part of the aircraft. The idea was to disable the plane.

Henry Blaxland KC was plainly struggling. The judges were deliberately preventing him from articulating his argument. He is a criminal defence barrister and used to addressing juries, which are a cross section of the decent British public. Here his audience was much more difficult: four rather stupid, elderly white men hand-picked for their extreme right-wing opinions, plus Lord Briggs.

He explained that the agreed evidence was that these were refuelling aircraft which had been regularly deployed to RAF Akrotiri for operations in support of Israel. When damaged by paint, they had been operationally replaced in 45 minutes. The incident could be dealt with by the ordinary criminal law.

Lord Stephens said that the ordinary criminal law did not deter them from damaging RAF planes.

Lord Lloyd Jones said that Brize Norton was a more serious incident, as it affected national security.

Henry Blaxland said he must now speedily conclude (having lost most of his time with the judges speaking more than he did).

The activities of Palestine Action were within the reach of ordinary criminal law. There were several alternatives to proscription which did not entail wide impacts on freedom of speech and had never been properly considered.

 1) Conspiracy. This covered a wide range of organisational behaviours and could have been used.
 2) Encouragement and Incitement. It should have been very straightforward to detect and arrest people for holding Open Days and Training Days and publishing information online which encouraged people to break the law and taught them how to do it.
 3) The Online Safety Act covered the web activity.
 4) The Public Order Act—this had not been considered.
 5) Civil injunctions. The Court of Appeal had dismissed this point, but these had been effective against Just Stop Oil and the Campaign Against Animal Cruelty.

Lord Sales said that the decision on proscription was for Parliament and the Secretary of State to make.

Henry Blaxland went on: What were the effects of the unnecessary proscription? A wide impact on freedom of speech. On a point raised earlier, Blaxland could attest that people had been charged as supporting Palestine Action on the evidence that they campaigned against its proscription.

Far from depriving Palestine Action of the oxygen of publicity and destroying its brand, the proscription plainly had the opposite effect.

Henry Blaxland KC then handed back to Raza Hussain KC to conclude Palestine Action’s case.

Hussain said that the Margaret Jones case was the locus classicus for this kind of action. It stood in a long and noble history. The suffragettes had been vindicated by history. In a liberal democracy the police and prosecution should behave with restraint when faced with non-violent civil disobedience on a matter of conscience. Lord Hoffman had stated in the judgement:

My Lords, civil disobedience on conscientious grounds has a long and honourable history in this country. People who break the law to affirm their belief in the injustice of a law or government action are sometimes vindicated by history. The suffragettes are an example which comes immediately to mind. It is the mark of a civilised community that it can accommodate protests and demonstrations of this kind. But there are conventions which are generally accepted by the law-breakers on one side and the law-enforcers of the other. The protesters behave with a sense of proportion and do not cause excessive damage or inconvenience. And they vouch the sincerity of their beliefs by accepting the penalties imposed by the law. The police and prosecutors, on the other hand, behave with restraint and the magistrates impose sentences which take the conscientious motives of the protesters into account. The conditional discharges ordered by the magistrates in the case which came before them exemplifies their sensitivity to these conventions.

Lord Sales interjected that it is for parliament and the Secretary of State to make the decision on proscription. (This was the seventh time he had interrupted to make this exact same assertion. I have not noted all his repetitive interruptions.

Raza Hussain continued that there had been a major impact from proscription. Thousands of people had been arrested for expressing their support for Palestine Action.

Lord Reed interrupted, saying that this was the consequence of Section 12 of the Terrorism Act, which the Secretary of State, who had the democratic mandate, had decided to bring into force by proscription and which had been approved by parliament.

Raza Hussain continued, “It was not only freedom of expression which had been constrained.” It was an offence carrying up to 14 years in prison to arrange a meeting which might give rise to a suspicion that it was in support of Palestine Action. 14 years for arranging a meeting.

Palestine Action had produced educational materials about the Israeli arms trade in the UK. This freedom of expression was also being disrupted. Palestine Action had a genuine belief that in the context of the genocide taking place in Gaza, disruptive action was necessary.

If you even say that you support only Palestine Action’s low-level activities, those which did not meet the official definition of terrorism, you are still liable to 14 years in jail. The legislation makes plain your intention is irrelevant.

Thousands of people have now been arrested. Hundreds of thousands more people wished to speak out, but their freedom of speech is curtailed because they could not afford to be arrested.

Freedom of speech and assembly are elevated rights, and political speech and activity are at the top of elevated rights. This was being severely affected, while the legislation gave very extensive intrusive powers to police and other officials.

The deference given to the Home Secretary in matters affecting national security should be attenuated in this case. On the Home Office’s own documents, the threat from Palestine Action was to the property rights of Elbit and other companies. The FCDO assessed that their activities had no foreign policy knock-on effect. Their overall impact on the UK defence industry was assessed as low.

Raza Hussain accepted that some deference needed to be accorded to the Secretary of State in matters affecting national security. But this was not primary. It depended on the reasons invoked in the evidence available to the Secretary of State in making her decision. There was very little good evidence. The open documents revealed no detailed assessment of a threat to national security. Not all national security risks are equal.

Lord Stephens said that it is for the Secretary of State to strike that balance, and she is democratically elected.

Raza Hussain said that there was no evidence to show that the Secretary of State had evaluated the balance between the national security threat and the impact on civil liberties.

The Secretary of State may have available expertise on the national security background. But she does not have available expertise on the impact of proscription on civil liberties, nor had she sought expertise. No deference should be given to her in assessing the weight of the opposing basket in the balance to be struck.

That concluded the case for Huda Ammori (which the government lawyers were to refer to throughout as the case for Palestine Action). Sir James Eadie KC now stood to open the government’s response.

It is very important, given that the Burnham government has attempted to hide behind this court case as an independent arbiter of whether they will continue with the proscription of Palestine Action, to understand that every word spoken here by James Eadie is spoken on behalf of Shabana Mahmood and the government of Andy Burnham.

Sir James Eadie stated that the Court of Appeal had applied longstanding legal principles in a proper way. It had also restricted the extent of this appeal. It had excluded any challenge to the factual basis of the proscription. Palestine Action is an organisation concerned in terrorism. That is the factual basis from which this court must start.

Palestine Action is intended to promote the use of violence. The court would consider whether any fresh proportionality exercise was even required. If the court chose to do such an exercise, it must rest upon the facts established by the lower courts.

The purpose of the Terrorism Act was to allow our society to exist and people to live without fear. Parliament had decided what activities constitute terrorism, and serious damage to property was one.

Parliament had placed no constraints on the powers of the Secretary of State to proscribe terrorist organisations. It is for parliament to decide the consequences that follow on proscription. These were designed by parliament to be effective and to stifle and disrupt the organisation.

Parliament was alive to the fact that these are significant powers with significant effects; that is why the decision is by the Secretary of State but requires approval by parliament.

This is a case of socio-political importance, went on Sir James…

Lord Sales interrupted to agree and said that was why the appeal court had made a fresh proportionality balance (which cancelled the victory of Palestine Action in the High Court).

Sir James agreed with Lord Sales. He said this was in effect a second appeal, and it was important that appeal courts should take a similar view.

Lord Sales said yes, and subsequent appeal courts should look to agree.

Sir James evidently felt that Lord Sales was going a bit far in making the government’s case for him and suggested that the permission to appeal process acted as a filter to decide on which issues the courts may differ, as they excluded many grounds on which the original case had been made.

Lord Sales said yes, but granting permission to appeal does not necessarily mean that a fresh view should be taken.

Sir James Eadie said that he agreed that in principle a second appellate court should seek to reach the same view as the first. However, perhaps the court could follow the same procedure but reach a different conclusion. Important points of fact which had been accepted should, however, not be reopened.

Sales and Eadie continued this pointless cycle of mutual backslapping for another few rounds. I gave up and wrote “Sales Eadie blah blah blah” in my notebook. When I zoned in again, incredibly, they were still doing the same thing.

Lord Sales said that the court should look again but give significant weight to the view of the appellate court. It was important to maintain appeal discipline.

Eadie said that before closing for the day, he had one further point to make, which was to draw the attention of the judges to the (infamous) sentencing remarks of Mr Justice Johnson in the Filton case.

With that, we thankfully reached 4pm and adjourned for the day.

I have not noted every judicial intervention during the presentation of Huda Ammori’s case, as there were well over one hundred.

It became very plain to me that this went beyond judicial testing of the strength of the case into active hostility designed to present the case as if it had been developed, with elements of ridicule. It was extraordinary and very unpleasant. Lord Briggs was the only judge whose behaviour appeared to me professional, whatever his actual opinions.

The interruption was so extreme that the case against proscription was not fully developed, and both KCs were forced by the judges taking up their time to cut major parts of their presentations.

These are top KCs who, in any normal circumstances, can keep a time limit. Even with severe cuts, due to the judges, they overran their allotted time of 3 hours and 45 minutes by 20 minutes. This means their final rebuttal will be cut from 30 minutes to just 10 minutes.

However, should Sir James Eadie take less than his allotted 2 hours and 45 minutes for the government case, then Raza Hussain could recover some of that lost time. The government will therefore seek to stretch out their rather thin arguments to the full time.

So you may think that the prolonged backscratching between Lord Sales and James Eadie was a pointless waste of time. No. It was a pointed waste of time.

While the court was in session, over thirty people had been arrested outside the court for expressing support for Palestine Action. On leaving I gave a few interviews, then left with some friends, including Matt O’Branain, for a bite to eat and a pint in the nearby Westminster Arms. Matt wanted to record me singing his Palestine Action song, which begins, “In the UK it is illegal to say, ‘I support Palestine Action…’”

I told Matt I needed a pint before I sang in public. On arrival at the pub, Matt had vanished. I asked if anyone had seen him. I later discovered that Matt had been arrested just behind me and carted off by the police for singing his song! I am afraid I was so intent on getting to the pub I had not noticed.

That was not the end of the strangeness. When I got back to Chelsea Cloisters, I found that the door of my room had been forced open and the door jamb split apart in the process. Nothing had, however, been taken—there was still £180 in cash I had left on the table. I reported the break-in to the front desk, who said that the CCTV was managed by an external security company.

This could have been an interrupted burglary, but burglaries involving smashing doors in busy hotels are pretty rare. Obviously serious security services can enter a room undetectably. This seems more of a frightener’s exercise.

Oh well, on to Day 2.