The Israel-Iran Conflict Is Now a Zero-Sum Game
Positing a Scenario Once the Americans Withdraw
The two-week ceasefire between the US and Iran announced on 8 April and agreement to negotiate Iran’s 10-point plan does not directly involve Israel thus suggesting that any lasting agreement between them will not necessarily lead to the same between Israel and Iran.
One of the ostensible goals of the Israel-American war of aggression on Iran is to effect regime change but this has not occurred and we can reasonably assume that the Iranian regime will continue to remain intact despite the onslaught.
We can also assume, following the end of the two-week ceasefire, that in the absence of a comprehensive agreement, the fighting will resume but it is likely that the Americans will withdraw first and claim some kind of victory, though it will be a hollow victory given that they have avoided attempting to seize control of the Strait of Hormuz because of the enormous losses they will inevitably suffer and, despite their armada in situ nearby, the status quo is likely to remain. This will leave the war to continue between Israel and Iran and its allies, Hezbollah and the Houthis. Admittedly, there are many unknowns.
One unknown is the future of US bases in the Gulf states: though all 13 have been heavily damaged during the war and, apparently, the US troops have largely abandoned them (though information regarding this is kept secret), the Iranians have demanded that the Americans do not return—the Gulf states know that the Americans will not protect them so will be realistic and likely acquiesce to this; otherwise, they risk an Iranian invasion based on the assumption that the US will not likely rejoin the war to expel them (see Hasan, 2026).
This will be a most troubling outcome for Israel—despite suffering great devastation and its defence arsenal considerably reduced, Iran’s de facto control of the Gulf will add to its geopolitical power. Israel fears Iran because, unlike all the Arab states who have meekly succumbed to Israeli power and abandoned the Palestinians, Iran unwaveringly supports the Palestinians. Therefore, it will indubitably continue with attempts at regime change with the aim of installing an Arab-type pliant regime and simultaneously pursue the break-up of the country.
Apart from attacking Iran four times in the past two years, Israel has a history of targeted assassinations of scientists and senior political and military personnel as well as cyberattacks—hence, Iranians know Israeli designs all too well. But the present war indicates that the conflict between Israel and Iran is now a zero-sum game meaning that a sustained political equilibrium will only be attained when one decisively defeats the other. If Iran is defeated, then the last major threat to Israel will have been removed though, of course, it will still have to contend with the much less powerful Hamas and Hezbollah. With a population of just 9 million (7 million Jews), Israel will be the predominant power of the Middle East and will meet with little resistance as it continues to annex more territories in the West Bank and neighbouring countries in line with the Greater Israel project.
But if the Iranian state survives and remains intact, then the war will continue and Iran, in turn, will seek to decisively defeat Israel, a nuclear power, which has proved an existential threat. Though Iran has caused considerable and unprecedented damage to all Israeli cities and towns, with a barrage of drone strikes and missiles, and will continue to do so providing that it can replenish its stocks, this will by no means be sufficient to defeat Israel.
Iran’s two necessary actions
At the time of writing, it is reasonable to assume that the Iranian leadership is seriously considering two necessary actions. First, to quickly develop or acquire a nuclear deterrent to prevent being attacked again by two nuclear powers. Trump’s genocidal threat against Iran will linger long in Iranian calculations—and will have united both regime supporters and the opposition in resisting the aggressors. With hindsight, we can conclude that Ayatollah Khamenei made a catastrophic blunder by ruling out the development of nuclear weapons—for, had he given the green light, Iran would not have been attacked. The example of North Korea is telling because it proudly boasts of possessing a nuclear arsenal which provides protection from an attack. This was understood by the influential Israeli military theorist Martin van Creveld as far back as 2004 in an article for the New York Times: “[h]ad the Iranians not tried [sic] to build nuclear weapons, they would be crazy” (van Creveld, 2004).
Indeed, the former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak, in an interview with PBS’s Charlie Rose in November 2011, was asked whether he would strive for nuclear weapons had he been in Iran’s shoes. Barak’s response was remarkably candid: “[p]robably…I don’t delude myself that they are doing it just because of Israel. They have their history of 4,000 years. They look around, they see the Indians are nuclear, the Chinese are nuclear, Pakistan is nuclear…Israel allegedly has it (military nuclear capability)” (cited in YNetnews.com, 2011).
Given that the US ostensibly decimated Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities in June 2025, Iran may not at present possess the necessary capability to develop a nuclear weapon. Assuming this to be true, this leaves Iran with the other, much quicker, option of acquiring nuclear weapons from a nuclear power—probably one of China, Russia, or North Korea. None of these countries will want to see Iran defeated and broken up so may be prepared to offer nuclear weapons—we can hypothesise that this is most likely to be North Korea. If so, Iran will test fire a weapon, perhaps several, which will signal that it is now immune from a nuclear attack from Israel or the US.
But this will not remove Israel’s determination to defeat Iran through conventional weapons, and, with its Terminator-like mentality, it will doubtless try again utilising its iron grip on the American political class to coerce the US to launch another joint attack. So, this ineluctably leaves Iran with the second necessary action: defeating Israel through a ground invasion. The key and perhaps decisive statistic here is that Iran has a much larger army: 610,000 versus 169,500; Israel has a larger reserve (465,000 versus 350,000) (Global Firepower [2026]), but with a population of over 90 million, if need be, Iran can significantly and speedily increase its reserve strength which Israel cannot match.
A major factor is whether the US and other western countries will militarily intervene to aid Israel—this might be politically unfeasible given the unpopularity in America and Europe of the present war. Accordingly, Iran may gauge that notwithstanding the inevitable pressure that will be applied by Israel and the Israel Lobby, western governments are not prepared to send their troops to die for Israel.
Once a decision has been made, it will be up to military planners as to how the invasion is implemented though there are two obvious fronts: first, amassing troops in southern Lebanon and, with Hezbollah, pushing the Israeli army out of Lebanon and into northern Israel and onto Haifa and Tel Aviv and second, from Jordan into southern Israel, pushing north into central Israel. It is highly unlikely that the Lebanese and Jordanian governments will reject Iran’s designs.
Crucially, Iran will first need to neutralise the Israeli air force, a formidable killing machine, which has caused so much devastation in the region and will be the main threat as troops land in Lebanon and Jordan. This will necessitate the relentless bombing of hangars and aircraft therein, and runways so that fighter jets and bombers are either destroyed or unable to take off—assuredly an extremely challenging task. But if that is attained to an acceptable level, by force of numbers, the Iranian army will have the upper hand in ground battles. A fact worth dwelling on is that there is much exhaustion of IDF forces after two years of fighting Hamas and, after a pause of sixteen months, the resumption of fighting Hezbollah. An exhausted army will struggle to halt a much larger, determined, enemy.
An Iran defeat of Israel will, of course, be an epoch-making event—the end of the Zionist state—whence the whole complexion of the Middle East will radically alter, including the liberation of the brutalised, dispossessed Palestinians and the end of repeated assaults on Lebanon; and, concomitantly, Israel’s enormous influence in western centres of power will end. Robert Pape has made the striking claim that the present war demonstrates that Iran is emerging as the fourth global power, after the US, China, and Russia, primarily because of its control of the Strait of Hormuz and a fifth of the world’s supply of oil (Pape, 2026). Despite his impeccable reasoning based on indubitable facts, I remain sceptical but would certainly concur with his claim in the event of an Israeli defeat.
References
Global Firepower (2026) Comparison of Iran and Israel Military Strengths (2026)
Hasan R (2026) Savage Minds, March 23, (16) Iran’s Gulf Ultimatum—Abraham Accords, US Bases, and the Threat of Regional Invasion
Pape R (2026) April 9, “The War Is Turning Iran Into a Major World Power”: U. of Chicago Professor Robert Pape | Democracy Now!
Van Creveld M (2004) ‘Sharon on the warpath : Is Israel planning to attack Iran?’, New York Times, 21 August, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/21/opinion/21iht-edcreveld_ed3_.html
YNetNews.Com (2011) ‘Barak: I’d want nukes if I were Iranian’, 17 November, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4149441,00.html
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